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ABSTRACT
Symbolic Interactionists maintain that a process of 
definition is inherent in all human interaction. This 
process is assumed, by Herbert Blumer and others, to be 
an indeterminate process. Some symbolic interactionists 
have argued that, because of this indeterminism, a dif­
ferent methodology from that used in the natural sciences 
is required for the analysis of human actions: others have 
suggested that symbolic interactionism cannot be a science.
This analysis has the following objectives:
1. The delineation of the major elements of Blumer’s 
symbolic interactionism.
2. The analysis of the relationship between language, 
objects and distinctions.
3. The delineation of the major characteristics of 
covering-law explanations and the compatibility 
of these characteristics with the major elements 
of symbolic interactionism.
It will be shown, in the first chapter, that Blumer 
emphasizes the process of self-indication and that he does 
not differentiate between language and objects. It will 
also be shown that two presuppositions pervade Blumer’s
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approach: l) that man Is capable of originative mental 
synthesis; and 2) that human social life is characterized 
by a subjective factor.
Blumer argues that, even when a ’situation* has a 
prescribed ’meaning’, the process of self-indication en­
ables an actor to reject, accept, or modify the prescribed 
’meaning’. As a result of his emphasis upon the process 
of self-indication, Blumer gives little attention to the 
symbolic-nonsymbolic dichotomy, and none to the language- 
object dichotomy. To him, both language and objects are 
human constructs, as are moral principles. Blumer denies 
that symbolic interactionism cannot be a science and pro­
poses two ’modes of inquiry’: Exploration and Inspection. 
However, he asserts that complete descriptions may elimi­
nate the need for theoretical schemes, and it is therefore 
suggested that he is ambivalent concerning the utility of 
theoretical explanations. It is also argued that he is 
equally ambivalent concerning the ’objectivity’ of histo­
rical knowledge.
The second chapter explicates the process of making 
a distinction and analyzes its relationship to language 
and objects. Two usages of the term ’distinction’ are 
delineated. Blumer, it is shown, argues that the actor
/
ii
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can make private distinctions and, since Wittgenstein has 
argued against this, an attempt is made to evaluate Wit­
tgenstein's argument. The analysis indicates that the 
process of making a distinction is a form of rule-foilowing 
behavior.
The nature of language is examined in order to ex­
plicate the characteristics of rule-following actions and 
%
to ascertain the utility of the symbolic-nonsymbolic 
dichotomy. It is argued that logical principles are not 
derived from language, but are apriori. From this it is 
inferred that animals may use, or appear to use, some 
logical principles; and it is argued that animals do make 
distinctions. This, it is suggested, means that the 
symbolic-nonsymbolic dichotomy is of little significance 
in the study of human social behavior: everything is symbolic, 
The apriori nature of logical principles also indicates that 
the same logical principles can be observed in all societies.
The relationship between the Emic-Etic concepts and 
the two types of distinctions is briefly examined and a 
number of similarities are suggested.
The relationship between language and objects is ex­
amined and Blumer’s non-differentiation of these two con­
cepts is shown to be congruent with the analyses of Quine
iii
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and Wegner: words and objects are severally meaningless and 
only become significant when related to the total knowledge 
of the group. Quine's analysis shows that there is a 
'systematic indeterminacy' concerning the empirical re­
ferents of all statements and it is argued that this places 
severe restrictions upon all ethnographic studies; the 
statements in any language are open to more than one inter­
pretation.
The process of making a distinction is seen to involve 
the attachment of value to a distinction and it is argued 
that Blumer's assertion that moral principles are human 
constructs is congruent with the 'non-cognitive' meta- 
ethical approach to ethics. This approach is seen to pre­
sent serious limitations upon the objectivity of histor­
ical knowledge.
The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the 
conscious-unconscious aspects of rule-following behavior.
It is suggested that it is not essential that the actual 
decisions of the actor be conscious, providing that the 
actor has the ability to easily become aware of them.
The third chapter discusses the major character­
istics of covering-law explanations and the compatibility 
of the major elements of symbolic interactionism to these
iv
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characteristics. It is acknowledged that there is a
continuing controversy among philosophers of science
$
as to the nature of scientific explanation. Hempel's 
covering-law model is assumed, for the purpose of this 
thesis, to be the most respected current theory of 
scientific explanations. It is noted that Hempel was 
striving to create a nonpragmatic model of scientific 
explanation as had been developed in mathematics. Brief 
reference is made to Popper's important distinction between 
laws and trends, and to Ayer's distinction between 'gen­
eralizations of fact' and 'generalizations of law'.
Watanabe's Ugly Duckling Theorem is presented and it 
is argued that his proof of the nonlogical nature of clas­
sification severely limits Hempel's model. It is also 
argued that Watanabe's theorem precludes the development 
of covering-law explanations which Involve Emic descriptions.
It is suggested that this conclusion is congruent with 
Peter Winch's assertion that a nomothetic science of human 
behavior is impossible. Winch's arguments have received 
many criticisms and some of these are examined in order to 
ascertain the validity of his assertion. The criticisms 
examined did not refute Winch's assertion insofar as it 
concerned rule-governed behavior.
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The game of chess is used to illustrate some of the 
problems of developing covering-law explanations for rule- 
following behavior. Some of the problems of validation 
are also delineated. The extent to which social behavior 
is rule-governed is illustrated with an excerpt from M. 
Tumin.
The fourth chapter discusses briefly the various ap­
proaches that social scientists can use to analyze rule- 
governed behavior: covering-law models having been excluded. 
It is suggested that the primary task of social scientists 
is the delineation of behavior which is characterized as 
rule-following from that which is not. It is also suggested 
that the analysis of rule-governed behavior requires the use 
and knowledge of the various types of logic: symbolic, de- 
ontic and modal logic.
vi
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PREFACE
Basic Orientation
The study of social phenomena has been approached 
in various ways(lN)*. Symbolic Interactionism refers to 
the approach that emphasizes that social behavior is built 
out of the joint actions of the actors(2N). Interactionism, 
a term covering a number of separate ways of studying social 
phenomena, has been sub-divided into nine schools: one of 
which is termed the Blumer school(3). This school focuses 
upon the more subjective aspects of social behavior and 
bases its approach upon the philosophical analyses of George 
Herbert Mead. It asserts that the appropriate methodology 
is the ’direct study’ of social actions, e.g. participant 
observation(4).* It maintains that a process of definition 
is inherent in all human interaction, and this process is 
seen as an indeterminate process in which the ’meaning’ of 
an ’event’ is not to be considered as intrinsic to the ’event’, 
but is attached to the ’event’ by the actor or actors(SN).
All reference numbers that have an N appended 
indicate that there is an elaboration at the end of the 
chapter. If there is no N, the number refers only to a 
citation.
ix
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
statement of the Problem
The emphasis that Blumer places upon the indeter­
minacy of the process of definition has led to the charge 
that symbolic interactionism cannot be'a science. Blumer 
has denied this charge, but his attitude toward theoretical 
explanations is ambivalent: he suggests that complete des­
criptions of a state of affairs may obviate the need for 
analytical explanations. His ambivalence may be a result 
of the argument, proposed by other scholars, that a nomo­
thetic science of social behavior is impossible(6N).
The problem to be analyzed is whether the nature of 
symbolic interactionism, as delineated by Blumer, precludes 
theoretical explanations of a nomothetical form, thereby 
limiting the utility of nomothetic methodologies.
Objectives
1. The delineation of the major elements of Blumer’s 
symbolic interactionism.
2. The analysis of the relationship between language, ob­
jects and distinctions.
3. The delineation of the major characteristics of covering- 
law explanations and the compatibility of these charac­
teristics with the major elements of symbolic inter­
actionism.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
NOTES: PREFACE
1. Alan Dawe suggests that all sociological research 
can be divided into two approaches: the Social 
System perspective and the Social Action perspec­
tive. (Dawe, 1970:207-218).
2. Warshay, 1971:29.
3. Warshay, 1971:29. See also chapter I of this thesis.
4. Warshay, 1971:29.
5. Not all interactionists share this belief in the 
indeterminacy of the process of definition. See 
Manford H. Kuhn, 1970:49-59).
6. While the issue concerning determinism and free will 
cannot be discussed in this thesis, Ernest Nagel 
has suggested that determinism is desirable for 
scientific inquiry:
...determinism can be regarded as a 
fruitful maxim or regulative principle 
for inquiry... if it is abandoned, then 
inquiry in certain directions is, at 
least temporarily, brought to a halt.
(Nagel, 1968:199).
xi
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CHAPTER I 
BLUMER: SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM
The term symbolic interactionism was introduced by 
Herbert Blumer in 1937(l), and refers to a particular 
approach to the study of human life(2). The principles 
underlying this approach have been traced to G. Simmel 
and M. Weber in Germany(3), and to George Herbert Nead, 
John Dewey, W.I. Thomas, William James, Charles Norton 
Cooley, Florian Znaniecki, Robert E. Park, James.Mark 
Baldwin, Robert Redfield and Louis Wirth in America(4N).
It has also been related to the writings of John Locke, 
David Hume and G. Tarde(5). To the extent that symbolic 
interactionism analyzes the nature of man and society, 
its origins can be traced back to the earliest philoso- 
phers(6N). The analyses of the philosophers were often 
more speculative than empirical(7N).
There appears to be some disagreement among socio­
logists concerning the nature and scope of symbolic inter­
actionism, Swanson, in the International Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences, states that it "...refers to the 
process by which individuals relate to their own minds or 
the minds of others."(8). However, Blumer broadens its
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
scope to include man’s interaction with all ’objects’, 
concrete or abstract, human or animal, animate or in- 
animate(9). Arnold Rose suggests that there are two 
kinds of environments: social and physical(10). Rose 
also delineates two strains of symbolic interaction 
theory: one is concerned with the study of the socializa­
tion of the child, the other studies social processes and 
social organizations(U N ),
I have chosen to present Blumer’s variation of 
symbolic interactionism because: l) he coined the term;
2) he is considered one of the foremost exponents of this 
approach(l2N); and 3) he is highly respected within 
sociology(13N). There are other contemporary sociolo­
gists who have proposed similar schemes and some of these 
will be referred to in this paper(l4N).
Symbolic interactionism has been described as more 
of an orientation than a systematic theory(l5). As an 
orientation it manifests several ambiguities(16N), This 
presentation of the principles of symbolic interaction 
will include some of Blumer’s criticisms of other socio­
logical approaches to the study of man and society. His. 
criticisms,se^en as definitions by negation, will allow a 
clearer delineation of his approach(17N).
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This presentation of Blumer’s approach will attempt 
to show the pervasive influence of two presuppositions. 
These are: i) that^man is capable of "originative mental 
synthesis"(18N) and 2) that human social life is uniquely 
characterized by a subjective factor(l9N).
Blumer bases his theory on Mead’s analysis of human 
group life(20N), and in Blumer’s opinion, the "key feature 
in Mead’s analysis is that the human being has a self"(21), 
He observes that there is nothing esoteric about the self 
(22N), and states that Mead postulated the "self" in order 
to allow the actor to be "the object of his own actions" 
(23). The ability to act towards himself is the "central 
mechanism" with which the actor deals with the world(24).
It allows the actor to make indications to himself of the 
things in'his surroundings(25). This process of indicating 
to himself is the equivalent of consciousness(26), and this 
ability emerges, along with the mind and the world of "ob­
jects", from human group life(27). Anything which the 
actor is conscious of is something which he is indicating 
to himself. If he is not indicating it to himself, he is 
not conscious of it(28). This emphasis- upon consciousness 
leaves Blumer open to the criticism that he ignores the 
"unconscious" part of the self(29N). Blumer does admit
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that there are rare cases in which there is no self­
indication, such as "the mood of melancholy, the craving 
of a drug addict for narcotics, a burning rage and fright 
in a panic". However, he claims that these states are 
not characteristic of social interaction:
(These) instances are not the pro­
totype of human social interaction...
(because) they stand in opposition to 
group life. If everyone expressed 
freely his felt tendencies and at­
titudes, social life would become a 
state of anarchy(30N).
Blumer states that the self is not the same as the
ego. The ego would only be a self if it was reflexive.
Neither can the self be considered as some kind of organ­
ization of attitudes: "The reflexive process... alone can 
yield and constitute a self"(31N). The possession of a 
reflexive self allows the actor to interpret and organize 
the world:
...he acts toward his world, in­
terpreting what confronts him and
organizing his actions on the basis
of the interpretation(32).
The process of interpretation is also a process of 
definition(33N), and this dual process involves attaching 
meaning to something: that is, making it into an object 
(34, see also 40N).
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...objects are human constructs and 
not self-existing entities with in­
trinsic natures(35N).
Blumer emphasizes that anything can be an "object", 
including ghosts, abstract moral principles, a mother, a 
priest, students, etc.(36N).
Blumer’s use of the terms ’meaning’ and ’object’ is
such that it is not possible to use one without implying
the other; they seem to be synonyms:
...the environment consists only of 
the objects that the given human
beings recognize and know. The
nature of this environment is set 
by the meaning that the objects 
composing it have for those human 
beings(37).
The meanings are formed both by the process of social 
interaction(38) and by the individual actor(39), and be­
cause the actor may redefine the ’object’ or situation, 
there is an inherent uncertainly concerning the ’meanings’ 
or situations(40N). This indeterminacy can be seen to be 
the result of the "reflexive" property of the self; the 
"originative mental synthesis" of the actor.
The term "meaning" can also have an expressive sense,
in addition to its referential sense. It would appear that
when Blumer states that the actor "attaches meaning", he is 
referring to both the expressive and referential aspects 
of’meening’. If this is the case, the criticism that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Mead (and thereby Blumer) ignored the role of affective
elements in social interaction is unwarranted(41). The
actor can, and apparently must, evaluate (appraise, judge,
assess) the ’objecf’ each time he indicates it to himself
(42N). This process of evaluation would seem to determine
both the significance and the sentiments that are "attached"
to the ’object *(43N). He does state that attitudes, as
expressed in action, are a consequence of the process of
definition, in which he perceives:
The vital dependency of the at­
titude on the nature of the on­
going interaction ...(44N).
' Blumer's emphasis upon the primacy of the process of 
self-interaction(45N) makes him very critical of theories
that use structural or cultural factors, such as values,
norms, roles, status demands, rules, reference group af­
filiation, institutional pressures or social system re­
quirements, as determinants of social action(46). These 
factors may act as ’limits’(47) or frameworks within which 
social action takes place(48) but even stable and repeti­
tive forms of social action do not occur automatically; 
the processes of self indication and social interaction 
are always present:
What takes place in these two pro­
cesses largely determines the sta­
tus and fate of norms or rules;...
(49N).
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While he acknowledges that there are cases of 
"highly ritualistic" behavior, he suggests that these 
are not the prototype of human group life(50), except 
possibly in isolated primitive or peasant communities 
(51). It must be noted that the process of self-indica­
tion is itself a form of rule following, and that Blumer 
is therefore arguing against the determinate nature of 
rules that are external to the self.
Blumer does, however, refer to the ’historical di­
mensions’ of social actions, but his statements con­
flict. In one case he asserts that it is invalid to 
isolate any form of social action from its ’historical 
linkage’(52), while in another he observes that ways of 
human living are "... seemingly products of historical 
experience"(53: my emphasis). It appears that he wants 
to show some historical continuity between social actions 
but is inhibited by his prior commitment to the primacy 
of the process of self-indication:
It is highly important to recognize 
that the established patterns of 
group life just do not carry on by 
themselves but are dependent for 
their continuity on recurrent af­
firmative definition(54).
...The career of joing actions also 
must be seen as open to many possi­
bilities of uncertainty... one,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8joint actions have to be initiated - 
and they may not be. Two, once 
started, a joint action may be in­
terrupted, abandoned, or trans­
formed. Three...(55N).
Blumer acknowledges that the ’domain’ of social 
science is the study of joint actions but insists that 
these joint actions must be seen as "an interlinkage of 
the separate acts of the participants"(56). Social 
action is the primary subject matter and society "must 
necessarily be seen in terms of the acting units that 
form it", rather than in terms of units, such as social 
classes that do not act(57N). And, for Blumer, one of 
the more important ’actions’ is the process of self- 
indication(58N). He suggests, as has been noted, that 
the actions of the actor may be limited by societal or­
ganizations, roles and historical linkages; but the de­
gree of limitation is unclear(59N).
He does not distinguish the action of speaking from 
other types of action because both are symbolic, i.e. ob­
jects are as much human constructs as words(60N). Blumer 
discusses the distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic 
interaction in only three paragraphs(61), and he provides 
two examples of non-symbolic interaction: reflex responses, 
excluding a boxer who identifies ("reflectively") a forth­
coming blow as a feint(62); and "unwitting" responses to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the tone of another's voice(63N). These two examples 
suggest that the distinguishing characteristic of non- 
symbolic interaction is that it is unconscious, and this 
seems congruent with his stress upon consciousness. Very 
few references to language occur in his writings(64N), 
and I will attempt, in the following chapters, to show 
that this is a consequence of his emphasis upon the pro­
cess of self-indication.
Social order is the result of "...the fitting to­
gether of acts to form joint actions"(65). This may oc­
cur for many reasons, including "sheer necessity". It 
is not a case of the internalization of norms but of taking 
the roles of others. "Social control becomes fundamentally 
and necessarily a matter of self-control"(66N). The social 
order, for Blumer, is characterized by continual change; 
and this flux is a direct result of the actor's ability to 
’reaffirm’ a current ’definition of the situation’):
Social change becomes a continuous 
indigenous process in human group 
life instead of an episodic result 
of extraneous facts playing on es­
tablished structure(67Nj.
It is perhaps this aspect of symbolic interactionism 
that has led some critics to state that it cannot be a 
science. Blumer observes that this is an "astounding 
charge"(68), and suggests that these critics have a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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"profound misunderstanding of both scientific inquiry and 
symbolic interactionism"(69). He outlines two modes of 
inquiry: "exploration" and "inspection". The major re­
quirement of both of these methods is "a return to the 
empirical social world"(70). Exploratory research would 
give an accurate description of some area of social life 
and this, Blumer states, may be enough to answer theoretical 
questions, or to eliminate the need for a theory:
...the fuller descriptive account 
it (exploration) yields will fre­
quently give an adequate explana­
tion of what was problematic with­
out the need of invoking any the­
ory or proposing any analytical 
scheme(71N: my brackets and em­
phasis) .
Blumer’s minimization of the value of analytical 
schemes, illustrated in this quotation, will be shown in a 
subsequent chapter, to be a result of his emphasis upon the 
"process of self-indication".
The "inspection"mode of inquiry involves analysis to 
discover "generic relationships" and "discriminating ana­
lytical elements" (i.e. concepts)(72). This mode of inquiry, 
"inspection", is proposed in one of his more recent publica­
tions. In earlier essays he has asserted that no generic 
relationships have been discovered yet by sociologists 
("Sociological Analysis and the ’Variable’"), and that there
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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are no concepts with fixed denotations in sociology"(What 
is wrong with Social Theory)." In the latter essay, he 
suggested that "definite concepts" were not suited to the 
study of social phenomena(73N).
As was noted, Blumer distinguishes between symbolic 
interactionism and other theoretical approaches which also 
acknowledges that human life is characterized by a sub­
jective factor. The major difference is that symbolic 
interactionism attributes the source of "meaning" to both 
the process of social interaction and the process of self­
indication:
The meaning of a thing for a person 
grows out of the ways in which other 
persons act towards the person with 
regard to the thing...(74)
To this extent symbolic interactionism is congruent 
with other approaches, such as that of Max Weber. How­
ever, Blumer also observes:
...it is a mistake to think that 
the use of meaning by a person is 
but an application of the meaning 
so derived. This mistake seriously 
mars the work of many scholars who 
otherwise follow the symbolic in- 
teractionist approach... the use of 
meanings by the actor occurs through
a_ process of interpretation..... .
The actor selects, checks, suspends, 
regroups and transforms the mean­
ings... Accordingly, interpretation 
should not be regarded as a mere 
automatic application of established 
meanings, but as a formative pro­
cess ...(75).
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Blumer’s approach can be compared with the follow­
ing statement by Robert A. Stebbins in an article en­
titled "Studying the Definition of the Situation: Theory 
and Field Research Strategies":
...For classes of actors within 
an identity, what predispositions 
are activated by elements in the 
ongoing setting that lead to the 
selection of one of these defini­
tions instead of another?(76: my 
emphasis).
Stebbins appears to be using a stimulus-response ap­
proach: and implicitly denies that there is any "formative
process" by the actor. This is not symbolic interactionism 
as defined by Blumer. Blumer explicitly denies that the 
self is a collection of ’predispositions’ or attitudes (see 
note 31), and insists that there are no fixed ’elements' in 
the social world that ’activate’ that self in any deter­
minate manner:
The process of self-indication
by means of which human action
is formed cannot be accounted 
for by factors which precede 
the act(77).
This presentation of Blumer’s approach has, at times, 
ignored some of his statements that appeared to conflict 
with the main trend of his argument. For example, he as­
serts, at one point, that it is important that the re­
searcher discover how the actors see their "key objects":
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The depiction of key objects that 
emerge from such accounts should 
...be subject to...critical dis­
cussion by a group of well-in­
formed participants in the given 
world. This latter procedure is 
a genuine "must" to guard against 
* the admitted deficiencies of in­
dividual accounts(78).
The use of the word "key" in the above statement
implies that there are such 'things’ as "key objects",
and suggests that if the researcher manages to ’depict’
them he will have noted something ’solid', ’real’ or
’permanent’ about that group. In itself the statement
is innocuous, but in conjunction with Blumer’s emphasis
upon the process of self-indication it is incongruous.
For instance, he has stated:
...to presume that a knowledge of an 
attitude toward an object in one sit­
uation foretells action toward that 
object in a different kind of situat­
ion is to seriously misunderstand and 
misrepresent the nature of human act- 
ions(79).
In other words, key objects are only key objects relative
to particular situations. Elsewhere he asserts:
Objects have no fixed status except 
as their meaning is sustained... 
nothing is more apparent than that 
objects in all categories can under­
go change in their meaning ... human 
group life is a process in which ob­
jects are being created, affirmed, 
transformed, and cast aside(80: my 
emphasis).
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The major problem, then, is not the description of 
the "key objects" of a group at any one time, although 
this does present difficulties, but the theoretical 
status of these "key objects".: objects which can be 
"cast aside" at any time, and which will be "cast aside" 
at some time. The problem is to develop a theoretical 
scheme which will explain which "key. objects" will be 
cast aside, when this will occur, the order in which it 
will occur, and which other objects will become "key ob­
jects". The answer to this problem hinges upon the re­
lationship between objects and the process of self­
indication.
The process of self-indication is a process in which 
the actor indicates something to himself, and all humans 
have this ability to make indications to themselves. The 
major point of his argument is that the actors cannot not 
indicate to themselves: there is a "meaningless infinity 
of the world process" and the act of ’perceiving’ one 
’thing’ in this "infinity" is an act of self-indication.
As long as we speak of an actor ’acting’, rather than of 
chaotic or purposeless movements, we must acknowledge that 
the process of self-indication is continuously operating, 
and that the actions can only be classed as ’actions’ when 
there is some order or value perceived in them.
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The ability to indicate to oneself can also be 
described as the ability to make distinctions: to in­
dicate something to oneself is to distinguish one ’thing’ 
from the ’infinity’ of things. It must, however, be re­
cognized that there are no ’things’ ’out there’. For 
example, there are no ’things’ like ’trees’ ’out-there’: 
the actor creates the ’tree' and creates the ’edges’ or 
’boundaries’ of the ’tree’ which separate the ’tree’ from 
the "meaningless infinity of the world process". It is 
because that ’tree’ is a creation of the actor that it 
has’meaning’: the actor chose to create ’it’ rather than 
something else, or nothing, and by his action he has af­
firmed that ’it’ has significance. The action of indi­
cating must involve the exclusion of the majority of the 
’meaningless infinity of the world process'. To make a 
distinction is to distinguish something and it is a log­
ical contradiction to assert that what is distinguished 
is of thefsame order of significancejas that from which 
it is distinguished. "Man exists in action". Blumer af­
firms, and an action is not purposeless, it is an ex­
pression of the assessment of the situation made by the 
process of self-indication: actions are the result of the 
process of self-indication, and are therefore expressions 
of an evaluation.
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Blumer, in differentiating his approach from other 
approaches that also emphasize the existence of a sub­
jective factor in social behavior, denies that language 
determines the way in which actors see objects. He argues 
forcibly that the 'meaning' that is attached to any object 
or situation is not determined by any pre-existing factors: 
and such factors would include language. It is generally 
believed that there is some kind of determinate, or fixed, 
relationship between an object and a word; this is a re­
lationship that is clearly indicated in most discussions 
of "ostensive definitions". Blumer's argument obviously 
modifies this relationship, and the following chapter will 
attempt to further explicate the process of self-indication, 
and to corroborate Blumer's argument concerning the relation­
ship between language and objects, by presenting some con­
gruent arguments of other scholars.
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NOTES: C h a p te r I
1. Blumer, 1969b:lN.
2. Blumer, 1969b:l.
3. Rose, 1962:3.
4. Blumer: 1969b:l. Don Martindale adds Ernst Cassirer,
Jean Piaget, Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills to the list
of contributors. (Martindale: The Nature and Types of 
Sociological Theory, pp 339-375}.
5. Manis and Meltzer, 1970:V, 46.
6 . Cooley, one of the major proponents of this approach
titled one of his books: Human Nature and the Social 
Order.
7. Mead’s writings have been characterized this way. See 
Manis and Meltzer, 1970:5,6,22, and Blumer:61.
8 . Swanson: (I.E.S.S.) 441, Vol.5.
9. Blumer, 1969b:10.
10. Rose, 1962:5.
11. Rose, 1962:8. Leon H. Warshay distinguishes 9 varieties 
of "interactionism", the first being "the Blumer school", 
(Warshay:1971:29).
12. Manis and Meltzer, 1971:vi. Devereux has suggested that 
in analyzing a theory the substance of the theory is 
more relevant than its origins:
For it seems to me that when one is 
discussing a scientific theory, it 
is its substance rather than its or­
igins that ought to be the main fo­
cus of attention. (Devereux Jr.,
1964:4).
13. In 1939 he was invited by the Social Science Research 
Council to write the first of a series of works en­
titled "Critiques of Research in the Social Sciences".
He was editor of "The American Journal of Sociology?
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- from 1941-1952. He was president of the "Society 
for the Study of Social Problems" in 1954. In 1955 
he was president of the American Sociological As­
sociation, and from 1962-1966 he was vice-president 
of the International Sociological Association.
14. Sociologists such as Mclver, Bolton, Becker and Kuhn, 
Manford H. Kuhn states that the last twenty-five years 
has seen the development of numerous sub-theories "go­
ing by a variety of names other than symbolic inter­
actionism". He mentions the following sub-theories: 
role theory, reference group theory, social percep­
tion theories, self theory, dramatergical theories, 
interpersonal theory of H.S. Sullivan, and the Lan­
guage and culture orientation of Sapir-Whorf-Cassirer. 
(Manfred H. Kuhn:1970:48-59) Kuhn classifies some of 
these sub-theories as 'determinate’, and Blumer may
be referring to these when he observed that it is a 
mistake to assume that "... the use of meaning by a 
person is but an application of the meaning so de­
rived (from social interaction). This mistake 
seriously mars the work of many scholars who other­
wise follow the symbolic interactionist approach". 
(Blumer,1969b:5, my emphasis).
15. Manis and Meltzer, 1970:1, Manfred H. Kuhn, 1970:51.
16. Manfred H. Kuhn, 1970:48-52. He notes that the con­
fusion can be summed up as a contradiction between 
determinacy and indeterminacy "in Mead's overall 
point of view"(48).
17. Many of Blumer's essays include some statements con­
cerning methodology. These are frequently found in 
conjunction with criticisms of other "conventional" 
methods.
18. This term appears in Cooley's "The Roots of Social 
Knowledge": 80. Blumer refers to a "creative pro­
cess". (Blumer, 19695:135).
19. Blumer, 19695:118,119,125. He notes that the term 
'subjective' can be used in at least two ways. One, 
the legitimate use, in his opinion, which acknow­
ledges that social action has 'meaning' for the 
participants; and the "worst kind of subjectivism"
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in which the observer uses his own concepts and 
categories in describing the behavior of the 
actors (p 86,74,51)
A number of other sociologists have also stres­
sed that human behavior can only be understood when 
we have knowledge of what the participants consider 
to be significant. Max Weber states:
...knowledge of cultural events is 
inconceivable except on the basis 
of the significance which the con­
crete constellations of reality 
have for us in certain individual
situations....................... .
"Culture" is a finite segment of 
the meaningless infinity of the 
world process, a segment on which 
human beings confer meaning and 
significance. (Weber,1949:80-81),
Blumer acknowledges that others have emphasized the 
subjective aspect of human behavior, (p 79), but he 
claims that symbolic interactionism sees ’meaning' 
as having a different source (Blumer, 1969b:3).
This view can easily lead to extreme positions. For 
example, Cooley has stated that: "the imaginations 
people have of one another are the solid facts of so­
ciety" (quoted by Martindale: 347): and Ernst Cassirer 
observed: "Man does not live in a world of hard facts 
... He lives rather in the midst of imaginary emo­
tions, in hopes and fears... in his fantasies and 
dreams" (Cassirer, 1944:25). Blumer is aware that 
this appears to be solipsistic and argues that it is 
not so because the "empirical world can’talk back’ to 
our picture of it..." (Blumer, 1969b:22).
20. Blumer, 19695:1,8,78,79,82. Although he makes many 
references to Mead, I do not wish to imply that all 
Mead’s ideas have been adopted by Blumer. Blumer 
recently published a book (1969) entitled Symbolic 
Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Since this 
is his most recent work, other than an article on 
Fashion, I have based most of my analysis on it.
21. Blumer, 19695:79.
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22. Blumer, 1969b:12. He speaks of the 'self' mainly in 
terms of its function. In only one sentence does he 
refer to the composition of the 'self in terms of 
the "I" and "Me" of Mead (p 111). There is an ex­
tensive body of philosophical literature concerning 
the nature of mind, minds, self and consciousness.
A brief over-view is presented by Joseph Hospers in 
An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 2nd edi­
tion, 1953,1957. A lucid discussion concerning 
'minds' is presented by John Wisdom, 1949; Other 
Minds.
23. Blumer, 19695:12,62,79.
24. Blumer, 19695:80.
25. Blumer, 19695:80; see also: 5,13,14,15,49,62,63,81,82, 
83,85,96,97,111.
26. Blumer, 19695:13.
27. Blumer, 19695:61.
28. Blumer, 19695:80; see also: 13.
29. Meltzer thus criticizes Mead's analysis. Manis and 
Meltzer, 1970:22.
30. Blumer, 19695:97. Blumer states that the participants 
involved in social interaction have to "... arrest, 
reorganize or adjust their own intentions, wishes, 
feelings and attitudes" (66: my emphasis, see also: 82, 
83,96,111,1137^ If all wishes and attitudes have to
be 'adjusted' their origin would seem to be irrelevant 
for Blumer's theory. It seems that the 'unconscious' 
only becomes significant in social interaction if the 
actor is unable to 'adjust' his attitudes. Such a 
state would be seen as pathological.
31. Blumer, 19695:63. He devotes one essay to an attack 
on the belief that attitudes determine action: 90-100. 
See also: 63,83,112,113,81,65.
32. Blumer, 19695:63.
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33. Blumer, 1969b: 132, see also: 10,12,13,17,53,55,56, 
66,67,79. Blumer also uses the term "interpret" to 
refer to the process whereby the actors involved in 
interaction: "...build up their respective lines of 
conduct by constant interpretation of each other's 
ongoing lines of action", (p 66)
34. Blumer, 1969b:80, see also: 49,134.
35». Blumer, 1969b:68, see also: 134. This definition
would seem to imply that attitudes, wishes and sen­
timents are also 'objects': "An object... is... 
anything that an individual indicates to himself" 
(80). The individual does indicate his attitudes 
to himself when he modifies them (see note 30).
36. Blumer, 1969b:10. This would seem to imply that
moral principles, being 'objects' and hence 'human
constructs' are not derived from any source other 
than the self.
37. : Blumer, 1969b:ll, also: 69.
38. Blumer, 1969b:59, also: 11,12,17,19,67,69,71,132
and note 19.
39. Blumer, 1969b:5, also: 71,86,110,111,132.
40. Blumer, 1969b:135, also: 72,110,111,164-165. The 
structure of my sentence in the text is awkward be­
cause it is not legitimate to refer to the 'meaning 
of objects', since 'meaning' and 'object' are both 
human constructs and are, it seems, synonymous (p 
11). It is not always clear whether Blumer always 
uses the term 'object' as he defined it, or whether 
he sometimes uses it in the standard way; referring 
to things 'out-there'. See also quotation in text 
re 'recurrent affirmation' (note 54).
41. Manis and Meltzer, 1970:22.
42. Blumer, 1969b:110. The following references do not 
specify that the actor 'must' evaluate. The state­
ments usually just say that he does: 5,13,16,18,49, 
53,55,62,63,80,64,69,81,85,86,95,96,97,98,111,114, 
115. See note 30 concerning the actor's evaluation 
and control of attitudes.
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43.- Perhaps only the relative degree of sentiment Is at­
tached. Blumer does not state that the actor can
'create* sentiments such as love and hate. He does
say that such sentiments can be rejected (p 81).
44. Blumer, I969b:ll3, also: 81,94-97. Whenever the actor
is engaged in social interaction, there is also oc­
curring a process of self-interaction (p 111). He dis­
cusses the dependency of attitudes only in relation to 
the subsequent actions of the actor. He does not ex­
plicitly refer to the 'existence' of attitudes; that 
is, to their ontological status. To do so would in­
volve him in the problem of how we know the content of
'other minds' when there are no physical clues (see
note 22). He has frequently noted that concepts such 
as 'attitude' and 'sentiment' have no clear empirical 
reference. See pages 91,92,130,145, and the foot-note 
on p 45 for statements concerning the empirical re­
ferents of attitudes. See pages 33,45,129,143,146,
173 for his statements about concepts and empirical 
referents.
45. "Social scientists and psychologists are invited, in­
deed beseeched, to observe their own social action 
and see if this is not true". (Blumer, 1969b:55, my 
emphasis).
46. Blumer, 1969b :14,15,16,18,19,30,53,57,59,65,66,73,74, 
75,76,83,87,106,107,114,115,116,127-139.
47. Blumer, 1969b:58.
48. Blumer, 1969b:87.
49. Blumer, 1969b:59, also: 17,18,67,71,75,86,106,110, 
115,134. He does state that 'structure', i.e. roles, 
norms, values, etc., are important, but: "...only as 
they enter into the process of interpretation and de­
finition..." (p 75). He does not explain this state­
ment except to note that there are ritualistic rela­
tions. He does assert that organizations supply 
"fixed sets of symbols"(p 88).
See also subsequent quotation re 'recurrent affirma­
tion' (footnote 54).
50. Blumer, 1969b:115, also: 75.
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51. Blumer, 1969b:88.
52. Blumer, I969b:20.
53. Blumer, 1969b:106. Additional references to ’history; 
are made on pp 47,60,71,77,193.
54. Blumer, 1969b:67, also: 18.
55. Blumer, 1969b:71. There is also the problem of deter­
mining 'which history’ he is referring to, i.e. the use 
of ’thé'history of a social movement (p 47), or 'its' 
history (p 20) would seem to assume that there are 
historical 'facts’ or 'events', which have the same 
'meaning' (or significance) to all people. Yet this 
appears to conflict with the basic postulate that 
'objects' are created by individuals: "An object may 
have a different meaning for different individuals"
(p 11); (or groups, p 69)
56. Blumer, 1969b:17, see also: 8,12,13,15,16,18,20,49,50,
5 4 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 5 9 , 6 4 - 6 8 , 7 0 - 7 7 , 8 6 , 8 7 , 9 0 - . 0 0 .
57. Blumer, 1969b:85. He states that Mead saw the social 
act as the fundamental unit of society (p 70, also p 
8 ). He also states :
A cardinal principle of symbolic 
interactionism is that any empirical­
ly oriented scheme of human society, 
however derived, must respect the 
fact that in the first and last 
instances human society consists of 
people engaging in action (p7).
Blumer does not, however, provide criteria to distinguish 
one 'act' from another 'act', or 'act' from 'acts'.
58. Blumer, 1969b:13. He also states: "Fundamentally, action 
on the part of a human being consists of taking account 
of various things he notes..." (p 15, see also p 83).
59. Blumer uses the term 'action' to refer to both overt 
physical actions, which would include speech, and co­
vert actions, such as 'self-indications'. This is per­
haps why there are no clearly defined limitations in 
his presentation. The process of 'self-indication' 
would seem to have no limitations, except logical ones,
 such as round-squares, etc. I may, for example, define
myself as Napoleon Bonaparte, although if I also present
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this definition to the world the consequences may be 
other than I expected.
Overt physical actions appear to be more re­
stricted; I am, for example, unable to levitate, un­
able to travel from Canada to Australia in less than 
a certain period of time, and unable to live on air.
In this sense we can say that there are cultural uni­
versels; e.g. all humans eat, no human levitates. We 
could also perhaps specify the necessary chemical 
composition of the stuff that all humans must ingest. 
However, we could not say that all humans evaluate 
the edibility of their environment by the same cri­
teria; there are variations from culture to culture.
We, for example, do not eat rats. Blumer refers to 
this cultural variations when he states that while 
'attitudes* and 'feelings' are "...presumably pre­
sent and in operation in all human societies" there 
are many societies in which some particular form of 
expression of an 'attitude' is absent (he is referring 
to the phenomena of "Fashion': Blumer:"Fashion,"285). 
Furthermore, as Steward has observed, behavior which 
is universal must have a different explanation than 
behavior which varies from culture to culture.
(Steward, 1970:8f).
60. Blumer's view differs sharply from the common view 
that "actions speak louder than words". R.M. Hare 
expressed this view in "The Language of Morals":
If we were to ask a person 'What 
are his moral principles?' The 
way in which we would be most 
sure of a true answer would be 
by studying what he did. (Hare;
1952:1).
Blumer might, however, point out that this is merely 
the way one group evaluates the relative significance 
of action versus speech (see note 55).
61. Blumer, 1969b: 8-9, 66-67.
62. Blumer, 1969b:8.
63. Blumer, 1969b:66. Non-symbolic interaction appears to 
involve a logical contradiction.
64. "The word, then, is a symbol of a given process of con­
ception. By reason of its verbal or symbolic character, 
..." (Blumer, 1969b:159). This would seem to indicate 
that Blumer equates 'verbal' with 'symbolic'.
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65. Blumer, 1969b:76.
66. Blumer, 1969b:77. This suggests that the most basic 
reason Is fear; fear that one might not survive if one 
ignores the wishes of others. The concepts in the 
following quotation do not emphasize any form of 
altruism:
The participants may fit their acts 
to one another in orderly joint 
actions on the basis of compromise, 
out of duress, because they may use 
one another in achieving their 
respective ends, because it is the 
sensible thing to do, or out of 
sheer necessity. (Blumer, 1969b:
76, my emphasis) Cf quotation 
(footnote 30) on page 4 of this 
thesis.
67. Blumer, 1969b:77. The concept ’action' connotes move­
ment and change: "...human groups or society exists in 
action" (Blumer, 1969b:6).
68. Blumer, 1969b: 48.
69'. Blumer, 1969b: 49.
70. Blumer, 1969b: 34. The phrase is repeated twice on this
page. Similar proposals appear on pages: 21,23,27,33, 
35,37,38,47,49,55,60.
71. Blumer, 1969b: 42. It is not clear how distinctions
can reduce the need for explanations, e.g. a descrip­
tion can answer the question "What's going on here?'”
but only if it is an elliptical explanation - an 
"explanation-sketch". If there is a valid difference 
between descriptions and explanations, and Hempel as­
sumes that there is, as will be discussed in Chapter 
III, then no description can eliminate the need for 
explanations.
72. Blumer, 1969b:.43. Cf. "Concepts, which in the last
analysis are our analytical elements", p 45.
73. Both of these essays are reprinted in his latest book:
Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. 
"Sociological Analysis and the 'Variable'", pp 127-139.
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73. For his statement about generic see p 129. "What is
Wrong with Social Theory?", pp 140-152. For his 
statement concerning fixed denotation see p 147.
74. Blumer, I969b:4.
75. Blumer, 1969b:5.
76. Stebbins, 1969:208.
77. Blumer, I969h:82.
78. Blumer, 1969b:52.
79. Blumer, 1969b:96.
80. Blumer, 1969b:12.
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CHAPTER II 
DISTINCTIONS, LANGUAGE AND OBJECTS
In the preceding chapter, it was observed that the 
'meanings* that are attached to objects or situations have 
two sources: l) the process of social interaction (see
footnote 38, chapter I) and 2) the process of self-indi­
cation of the individual actor (see footnote 39, chapter 
I). However, Blumer emphasizes that the primary source of 
'meaning' is the individual: social actions are joint actions 
built out of the interlinkage of the separate acts of the 
participants (see footnote 56, chapter I). The emphasis is, 
therefore, upon the private 'meanings' that the individual 
attaches to objects and it is these private 'meanings' that 
may become joint 'meanings' if others reaffirm them. Of 
course, if there exists a group of people, rather than an 
aggregate, there will be shared 'meanings' as shared 'mean­
ings' are often one of the defining characteristics of 
groups. This is not to deny that children learn the 'mean­
ings' of sounds from adults: sounds that have shared 'mean­
ings'. But, as Humpty Dumpty suggested to Alice: 'words' 
can mean whatever one wants them to mean.
It was also observed that Blumer denies that 'meanings' 
are determined by pre-existing factors; and it was suggested
27
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that the relationship between the ’status’ of objects 
and the process of self-indication is a crucial factor 
that must be considered in all explanations of social be­
havior.
Blumer’s position can be contrasted with the fol­
lowing assertion of Winch, a scholar who also sees that 
social behavior is characterized by a subjective factor:
Our idea of what belongs to the
realm of reality is given for us
 ^ in the language that we use. The
concepts that we have settle for 
us the form of the experience we 
have of the world. (1, my emphasis)
Winch’s statement ignores the existence of the pro­
cess of self-indication and implies that once the researcher 
has learnt the ’language’ of a group he will also know how 
that group perceives ’reality’. While it appears, at first 
sight, that a knowledge of the group’s "concepts" will show 
the researcher how that group views ’reality’, or at least 
will show the limits within which their view of ’reality’
can be perceived, it is not clear how the introduction of the
’process of self-indication’ modifies this relationship be­
tween language and objects.
This chapter will attempt to delineate more precisely 
the concept ’process of self-indication’, examine its re­
lationship to language, and delineate the ways in which it 
modifies the language-object relationship.
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It will be argued that the ability used to make 
self-indications is the same as that used to make dis­
criminations, and the same as that used to make distinc­
tions; and that these actions are all forms of rule-fol­
lowing behavior. Two uses of the term ’distinction’ will 
be delineated and these will be shown to be similar to 
the usage of the terms Emic and Etic.
The relationship between logical rules and language 
will be discussed, and it will be argued that some logical 
rules are apriori; and that consequently all actions will 
be perceived as employing the same logic. This renders the 
symbolic-nonsymbolic dichotomy void for the study of social 
behavior. It will be shown that no unique relationship can 
be ascertained to exist between ’words' and 'objects' and 
that, although it is necessary to learn the language of the 
group, it is impossible to eliminate some indeterminacy of 
’meaning’ of any statement within the language: the mapping 
of their ’cognitive structure’ must be equally indeterminate.
Blumer’s assertion that moral principles are human 
constructs will be shown to be congruent with the anti- 
naturalistic ’noncognitive’ meta-ethical theories of ethics.
However, before proceeding with the analysis as out­
lined, it is necessary to note that Wittgenstein has argued 
against the possibility of a private language and against
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the idea of private objects;
Always get rid of the idea of the 
private object in this way: assume 
that it constantly changes, but 
that you do not notice the change 
because your memory constantly de­
ceives you. (2N)
Wittgenstein’s discussion of the concept ’private 
language’ involves an analysis of what it means to follow 
a rule. Language is considered to be a form of rule-gov­
erned behavior; language game(3). The possibility of a 
private language is dependent upon the possibility of pri­
vate rules.
Wittgenstein’s argument against the idea of a pri­
vate language can perhaps be circumvented by differentiat­
ing between ’use’ and ’mention’. That is, the difference 
between an actor’s ’use’ of a private language and our 
’mention’ (talk) of the actor’s use(4N).
Wittgenstein’s argument is directed against a par­
ticular kind of private language; a language that is not 
only not understood by anyone else, but that cannot be 
understood by anyone other than the speaker (5). This 
restriction seems unusual as it would at first sight ap­
pear that we could arrive at some understanding of the 
actor’s private language by just observing the situations 
of his utterances (6N). Wittgenstein attempts to refute
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this suggestion by presenting an analysis of the concept 
’rule’. His analysis rests upon the intersubjective prin­
ciple of verification. To talk meaningfully of rules, it 
is necessary that it should be possible (in principle) to 
verify our statements:
The proof that I am following 
a rule must appeal to some­
thing independent of my im­
pression that I am (7)
Wittgenstein illustrates the necessity of this con­
dition by stating that the concept ’rule’ is logically re­
lated to the concept ’mistake’: a rule is something that 
can be followed correctly or incorrectly, and if there is 
no way of proving whether someone is following a rule cor­
rectly or not, it is meaningless to talk of ’rules’(S).
He also argues that it is not possible to use one memory 
to verify another. He gives as an example the act of re­
collecting the departure time of a train, and asks whether 
the recollection can be checked by recalling a memory of a 
page of the time table:
...this process has got to pro­
duce a memory which is actually 
correct. If the mental image of 
the time table could not be 
tested for correctness, how 
could it confirm the correct­
ness of the first memory? (9)
Wittgenstein differentiates between ’thinking’ that 
one is following a rule, and ’obeying’ a rule:
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And to think one is obeying a 
rule is not to obey a rule.
Hence it is not possible to 
obey a rule ’privately'; other­
wise thinking one was obeying a 
rule would be the same thing as 
obeying it. (10)
Wittgenstein’s argument can now be seen to rest upon 
the concept of ’proof’: a proof is only a proof if it is 
intersubjactively verifiable (11). If we now stipulate, 
as he does, that a private language is only a private lan­
guage if it is not intersub.jactive, the private language is 
not open to this type of proof (see footnote 11N).
It should be noticed that in the last quotation, 
Wittgenstein does not argue against the possibility that 
an actor may think that he is following a rule, nor that 
the actor may believe that he is correctly following a 
private rule; but only that neither we nor he can verify 
it (intersubjectively).
Wittgenstein's argument relies heavily upon the be­
lief that memories can be false, and this is obviously often 
the case. However, it must also be acknowledged that an 
individual’s memory is not entirely capricious; if it were, 
there would be no principle of intersubjectivity. This 
principle itself rests upon the belief that memory is re­
liable most of the time for most people.
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Wittgenstein's argument, therefore, does not elimi­
nate the possibility that an actor can redefine a situation 
or create a private object. It does show that, over a 
period of time, an actor may recall that definition 'false­
ly', i.e. in a way that we, as observers (with a perfect 
memory?), but not the actor, see as inconsistent with his 
original definition.
Blumer asserts that the actor, by means of the pro­
cess of self-indication, attaches 'meaning' to objects:
The nature of an object - of any 
and every object - consists of 
the meaning that it has for the 
person for whom it is an object.
(12)
And, since objects have no intrinsic 'meanings', if 
the actor ceases to attach significance to 'it', then 'it' 
ceases to be an object: it becomes indistinguishable from 
the "meaningless infinity of the world process". The pro­
cess of creating an object, or of attaching 'meaning', is 
therefore a process which involves 'selecting' some aspect 
of the 'meaningless infinity' and, at the same time, at­
taching some 'meaning' to 'it'. The actor distinguishes 
that which is itself undistinguished. If we ignore the 
apparent solipsism it will be as equally valid to assert 
that the actor makes a distinction as it is to assert that 
he indicates something to himself. It is because the term
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’something’ occurs in English after the verb ’indicate’ 
that there is a tendency to assume that some ’thing’ is 
just waiting ’out-there’ to be indicated. The advantage 
of using the phrase 'make a distinction' is that it does 
not make such a forceful ontological commitment. In ordi­
nary usage the term 'distinction' refers to discriminations 
that people make; and it is often acknowledged that the 
distinctions that one person makes may not be shared by 
another.
It will be assumed in this thesis that the process of 
making a distinction is the same as the process of self­
indication: that both are a result of an inherent capacity 
(13N).
The concept ’distinction’ can be used in at least two 
different ways: ways that correspond to the two different 
sources of ’meanings’ that Blumer delineates. It can be 
used to refer to those aspects of the ’meaningless infinity' 
... that a group has distinguished and for which it has 
coined names, e.g. if a group distinguishes between what we 
call 'cats' and 'dogs’, they will, in all probability, have 
distinct ’words’ to name these 'objects’. It is this usage 
that Winch speaks of in the quotation on page 28: these 
shared ’meanings’ of a group. The Ethnosemanticists refer 
to these distinctions as Emic distinctions:
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Emic statements refer to logico- 
empirical systems whose phenomenal 
distinctions or 'things’ are built 
up out of contrasts and discrimi­
nations significant, meaningful, 
real, accurate, or in some other 
fashion, regarded as appropriate 
by the actors themselves. (14)
The second usage of the term ’distinction’ refers to 
the individual’s act of making a distinction: a distinction 
that need not have previously been made by other members of 
the group. This act, however, has two aspects: a cognitive 
aspect and an emotive aspect. The former aspect is apparent 
in the action of making ’stipulative definitions': the in­
troduction of new terms, say in science, which replace long 
descriptive statements (15N) . The second aspect of 'making 
a distinction’ refers to the action of attaching significance 
(emotive) to some 'thing'. One way of understanding this 
usage of the term 'distinction' is to note that, according 
to some philosophers, no value or moral prescription can be 
inferred from any factual description (16N).Therefore, when 
an actor makes a distinction, he is saying (to himself at 
least) that something is noteworthy; he is carrying out a 
process of grading (17N). Blumer emphasizes that the actor 
must appraise every situation in order to be able to act, or 
to continue acting (18N). In a similar vein, Rescher argues 
that in order for an actor to plan his future actions he, the
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actor, must evaluate alternatives which are mutually ex­
clusive (19).
The cognitive aspect of the second usage of the term
’distinction’ is similar to the Ethnosemanticists’ usage
of the term Etic:
Etic statements depend upon pheno­
menal distinctions judged approp­
riate by the community of scientific 
observers. Etic statements cannot 
be falsified if they do not conform 
to the actor's notion of what is 
significant, real, meaningful, or 
appropriate, (20)
If we allow the other group, the ’community of scienti­
fic observers’, to consist of only one person (a singleton 
set), then Etic distinctions correspond to the distinctions 
drawn by an individual actor; and, in effect, involve an 
alternate ’redefinition’ of the situation by an observer- 
actor. It should be noted that in those cases where the 
’redefinition’ of the situation agrees with the definition 
of the situation agrees with the definition of the situation 
gigen by the group he is studying, the Emic-Etic dichotomy 
fuses. For instance, if a scientific observer studies his 
fellow scientific observers, and uses their conceptual 
scheme in his analysis, there is no difference between Etic 
and Emic (21N).
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The two uses of the term ’distinction' delineated 
will be called ’distinction A ’ and’distinction B ’. The 
term ’distinction B ’ will be used, unless otherwise in­
dicated, to refer to both the cognitive and emotive aspects 
of making a distinction. The rejection of an existing dis­
tinction will also be considered as a case of ’making a 
distinction’. Since there are no intrinsic distinctions, 
it would be inappropriate to say that an actor ’failed’ to 
make a distinction (22N). The use of the term ’fail’ would 
also not be congruent with Blumer’s emphasis upon the pro­
cess of self-indication. These uses of the term ’dis­
tinction’ and the use of the terms Emic and Etic, imply 
that it is often possible to describe, or perceive, some 
’state of affairs’ in more than one way. For example, 
Edward Sapir observed that an anthropologist would mis­
describe an ’event’ if he was not aware of those aspects 
of it which were ’meaningful' to the natives:
He will find interesting what the 
natives take for granted... and he 
will utterly fail to observe the 
crucial turning points in the 
course of the action that gives 
formal significance to the whole 
... (23)
In more general terms some philosophers, such as 
Thomas Kuhn, state that any ’event’ can be described in 
at least two ways (24).
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If it is the case that an ’event’ or an ’action’ can 
be described in more than one way, it is possible that the 
’logic’ of the ’event’ can also vary. It has been argued 
that the principles of logic arise, in some way, out of the 
rules of language, i.e. that linguistic rules entail logical 
principles (25), and since linguistic rules can vary, the 
logical rules might also vary. For example, Kenneth Burke 
suggests that our concept of negation is derived from 
language :
... dramatism is devoted to a stress 
upon the all-importance of the nega­
tive as a specifically linguistic 
invention...(26, my emphasis)
The belief that language rules entail logical rules 
appears to commit us to the view that there could be a ’pre- 
logical’ language (27N). This opinion was at one time pro­
posed by Levi-Bruhl, and has recently been proposed by Paul 
Watzlawick. He differentiates two codes of communication: 
verbal and non-verbal, and describes non-verbal codes as 
analogic. He asserts that analogic codes are unable to 
express negatives and are therefore ambiguous. He illust­
rates this by observing that a clenched fist can indicate 
either anger or restraint, tears can be of sorrow or joy, 
and a smile may convey sympathy or contempt (28).
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The view that logical principles are derived from 
our language rules has been called ’linguistic-convention- 
alism’, and this position has been supported by P.F. 
Strawson (29). An alternative position, proposed by 
David Mitchell and others, is that logical principles are 
’a priori’: unlearnt and therefore unteachable (30). The 
difference between these two theories is considerable and 
neither has a clear superiority. However, Mitchell’s is 
more congruent with the arguments of Blumer and Quine and 
is therefore presented here.
One way of expressing the difference between these 
two positions is to ask, is it necessary, or merely con­
tingent, that a language have incompatible predicates?
That is, ^  ^  decide whether or not there are to be 
boundaries limiting the applicability of predicate words, 
in addition to deciding where they are to be drawn. 
Mitchell’s argument is that boundaries are necessary, al­
though we decide where the boundary is to be:
... if a word were applicable to 
anything whatever, it would be 
useless for the purposes of des­
cription.
... boundaries for the applica­
tion of words are and must be 
drawn somewhere. (31)
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Mitchell observes that the linguistic-convention- 
alism theory require that negative propositions constitute 
a type of affirmative propositions, and he asserts that 
this argument is unacceptable (32).
Using Blumer’s terminology we can ask, is it pos­
sible for an actor to indicate something to himself and 
yet in so doing not exclude what he indicates from the 
"meaningless infinity of the world process?" Mitchell 
states :
Negation cannot be explained away: 
it is implicit in all determinate 
thought whatsoever. For there is 
no such thing as pure affirmative 
thought. To understand what it is 
for an affirmative proposition to 
be true is in part to understand 
that its negation is false. To 
see. that ’p ’ is true is to see 
that ’not-not-p’ is true. Affir­
mation and negation are comple- 
mentory concepts neither of which 
is intelligible in isolation. The 
function of negation is to exclude 
and this function of exclusion, as 
Mr. Strawson himself has said, is 
implicit in all descriptive uses 
of language and, in fact, in all 
expression of thought whatsoever.
(33N)
The position expressed in this quotation can be con­
trasted with the quotation (given earlier) from Kenneth 
Burke. In particular, Mitchell’s assertion that affirma­
tion and negation "are complementary concepts neither of
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which is intelligible in isolation", suggests that Burke’s 
stress upon the "all-importance" of the negative is inap­
propriate. Mitchell’s argument also conflicts with 
Watzlawick’s argument. A code of communication, in order to 
be able to express affirmative propositions, must be able to 
express negative propositions: "To see that ’p ’ is true is 
to see that ’not-not-p’ is true".
If logical principles are ’apriori’ and not derived 
from language rules, language cannot be considered a neces­
sary condition for the manifestation of logical behavior. 
Entities that do not manifest any language-using ability 
may have the ability to manifest rule-following behavior. 
Furthermore, if logical principles are ’apriori’, we would 
be forced to interpret any other logic, if we assume that 
there could be such a variant logic, by means of our logic­
al rules (34N).
Blumer implies that the process of self-indication 
is specifically human ability and suggests, in his dis­
cussion of symbolic and non-symbolic action, that animals 
exist in a non-symbolic ’world’. However, we do attribute 
to animals the ability to make discriminations: Lindesmith 
and Strauss assert that it has always been known that ani­
mals could discriminate: for example, between chairs and 
beds (35N). If, as has been argued here, the ability used
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to make distinctions (36N) is the same as that used to make 
discriminations, then animals do not appear to differ from 
humans in this respect (37N).
However, if everything including ’objects' is symbolic, 
then defining a ’word’ by pointing to some object, for ex­
ample to define the word ’tree’ by pointing to a ’physical 
tree’ is to establish a relationship between two human con­
structs, two symbols; and this establishes a syntactical 
relationship (38N). That is, since both ’words' and ’ob­
jects’ are human constructs, the establishment of a relation­
ship between them is an assertion concerning the syntactica- 
lity of two symbols (human constructs).
While it is usually assumed that there is some defi­
nite relationship between language and ’reality’, there is 
no consensus among philosophers concerning this relation­
ship. There are various theories of meaning (39N), and al­
though none are considered adequate, there appears to be 
some agreement that the most basic use of the term ’mean­
ing’ occurs in ostensive definitions:
The notion lingers that to each 
statement, or each synthetic 
statement, there is associated 
a unique range of sensory 
events...(40)
Blumer, in asserting that both 'words’ and ’objects’ 
are human constructs, has eliminated the touchstone of
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’reality’ from ostensive definitions. Definitions are now 
a process of correlating one human construct with another 
human construct: the same process that occurs in syntactics.
A congruent analysis of the relationship between ’words’ 
and ’objects’ has been developed by Willard Van Orman Quine, 
and some congruent observations have also been made by 
Peter Wegner. Both of these authors minimize the significance 
of semantical relationships, thereby corroborating Blumer’s 
viewpoint.
Quine’s analysis is subtle and complex and any brief 
outline is bound to distort it. However, its importance(41N) 
warrants an attempt and it may be possible to convey his 
basic ideas by looking at two parts of his analysis: one, 
his delineation of the usage of the term ’meaning’, and two,
his analysis of what is involved in the process of making
ostensive definitions.
Quine observes that the term ’meaning’ is normally
used in two ways:
...the having of meanings, which 
is significance, and the sameness 
of meaning, or synonomy... If we 
are allergic to meanings as such,
we can speak directly of utterances
as significant or insignificant, 
and as synonymous or heteronymous 
one with another. The problem of 
explaining these adjectives ’sig­
nificant’ and ’synonymous’ with 
some degree of clarity and rigor - 
preferably, as I see it, in terms 
of behavior - is as difficult as 
it is important.(42)
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It should be noted that my use of the term ’sig­
nificant’ in this paper is not the same as Quine’s use
of it in the above quotation. For Quine, ’significance’
is an all or nothing term, whereas for me, it is a question
of degree. Furthermore, I use the term ’significance’ to
denote the emotive aspect of an expression, as well as its 
’cognitive meaning’ (43N),
’Significance’, for Quine, is that aspect of language 
which is studied by grammarians :"the grammarian wants to 
know what forms are significant, or have meaning" (44).
His analysis shows that the grammarian must study phonemes, 
and the criteria of what is to count as one phoneme or as 
two slightly different phoemes depends upon the concept of 
sameness of meaning, synonomy (45N).Quine discusses vaious 
types of synonomy: cognitive synonomy: stimulus synonomy; 
statement synonomy, as related to the verification theory 
of meaning, and analytical synonomy.
His examination of stimulus synonomy involves the 
analysis of the relationship between a ’word’ and some 
’sensory data’ (i.e. ostensive definition). He examines 
the methods a linguist would use to learn, in a radically 
different language, the relationship between the appearance 
of what seems to the linguist to be a rabbit and the noise 
(utterance) of the natives who apparently see the rabbit.
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He shows that it would not be possible for the linguist 
to decide whether a particular utterance refers to rab­
bit, rabbits, stages of rabbits, integral parts of rab­
bits, the rabbit fusion, or rabbithood (46). Quine con­
tinues by discussing the problems involved in translating 
analytical sentences: sentences that are synonymous and 
which are only indirectly related to experience (47). He 
concludes that there is still a systematic indeterminacy as 
to whether the translation is correct:
We may alternately wonder at the 
inscrutability of the native 
mind and wonder at how very much 
like us the native is, where in 
one case we have merely muffed 
the best translation and in the 
other case we have done a more 
thorough job of reading our own 
provincial modes into the na­
tive’s speech. (48N)
Quine acknowledges that he studied the translation 
of exotic languages because the factors involved would be 
more visible. However, "the main lesson to be learned con­
cerns the empirical slack in our own beliefs" (49). In his 
essay "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism", he concludes:
My present suggestion is that it 
is nonsense, and the root of 
much nonsense, to speak of a 
linguistic component and a 
factual component in the truth 
of any individual statement.
The idea of defining a symbol in 
use was, as remarked, an advance 
over the impossible term by term
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empiricism of Locke and Hume.
The statement, rather than the 
term, came with Bentham to be 
recognized as a unit account­
able to an empiricist critique.
But what I am now urging is that 
even in taking the statement as 
a unit we have drawn our grid 
too finely. The unit of empirical 
signifie nee is the whole of
science......................
The totality of our so-called 
knowledge or beliefs... is a man- 
made fabric which impinges on ex­
perience only along the edges.
(s o n )
It is important to note that this ’systematic in­
determinacy’ is also an intralinguistic phenomena. That 
is, since many statements in our language are only in­
directly related to sensory data, these statements could 
’mean’ different things to different people, and we would 
not be able to decide which of these possible ’meanings’ 
was correct:
If we were perverse and ingenious 
we could... devise other analytical 
hypotheses that would attribute un­
imagined views to our compatriot, 
while conforming to all his dis­
positions to verbal response to all 
possible stimulations. (51N)
Quine acknowledges that if two theories are empirical­
ly equivalent, then they may as well be considered one theory. 
However, his major point is that it is logically possible that, 
given two theories that agree empirically, there need be little 
or not agreement between, for instance, their conceptions of
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rabbits, rabbit stages, etc., and in particular that there
is no^  way of deciding which of the possible interpretations
is the correct one. Quine comments:
I am not sure that it even 
makes sense to ask. (52N)
Neither sentence nor terms can be considered to con­
vey meaning severally; the meaning is conveyed only when the 
statement or term is considered in conjunction with the whole 
body of knowledge of the group (culture). The usual dichotomy 
between ’words’ and ’things’ is no longer significant: there 
is no ascertainable correlation between the ’meaning’ of a 
’word’ and any ’object’.
Quine’s analysis is corroborated by Peter Wegner’s 
study of computer languages. In his discussion he observes 
that expressions (of a specified computer language) are de­
fined in terms of the way they may be transformed into other 
expressions (of that language). He acknowledges that this 
seems ’circular’ and that it would seem better to define the 
’meaning’ of the expressions by stating their correspondence 
to a ’predefined class of objects’. However, he asserts that 
it would be less useful:
... semantic definitions of languages 
in terms of the transformational pro­
perties of expressions of the language 
are generally more useful than semantic 
definitions in terms of class of objects.
(53)
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Wegner’S comments are essentially pragmatic, he does 
not explain why semantic definitions are less useful. How­
ever, Quine’s analysis would appear to be as relevant to 
computer languages as it is to natural languages (54N)>
The analysis of Quine (and Waisman, see footnote 54) 
suggests that ostensive definitions are of limited useful­
ness; even intralinguistically there remains the possibility 
of a ’systematic indeterminacy’. While this may pose no 
serious obstacles for the researcher who is merely re­
cording the statements made by the natives in response to 
questions (55N)>it does pose a serious problem for those 
who wish to ’get behind’ the utterances of the natives: 
those who, like the ethnosemanticist, wish to map the ’cog­
nitive systems’ of the natives (56N). They will be unable, 
it seems, to determine whether the natives conceive of rab­
bits, or rabbit stages, or rabbithood, etc., and when they 
attempt to delineate some of the native’s more intangible 
concepts, such as gods, spirits, love, etc., they will be 
"floating free of fact, and the best (they) can do is to 
"ensure consistency". (Scheffler, see footnote 50N).
The foregoing discussion suggests that we can expect 
researchers to come up either with data that seem incon­
sistent (57N), or with analyses that perceive a universal 
logical structure (58N),
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This chapter has dealt with aspects of human be­
havior which are considered to be ’rule-governed’. And, 
as Wittgenstein’s remarks indicate, ’distinctions’ are a 
type of rule-governed action. Rules, however, are neither 
true nor false; they may be followed correctly or incor­
rectly, but are justified only by their utility (59N).
Moral principles are frequently conceived of as rules, but 
there is some philosophical controversy as to whether these 
rules can be derived from ’facts’ (empirical statements). 
Blumer has asserted that moral principles are human con­
structs (footnote 36, chapter I), and in this respect his 
position appears similar to the views of some linguistic 
philosophers, in particular to the "noncognitive" approach 
of Charles L. Stevenson (60N).
Stevenson suggests that there can be two kinds of 
disagreement: a) in belief, and b) in attitudes. People 
may differ in their description of some ’event’, (i.e. in 
belief), or they may agree ’in belief’ but differ in their 
attitudes to the ’event’. Stevenson states that there can 
be no guarantee that agreement in belief will lead to agree­
ment in attitude: -
In considering whether a man is 
courageous... the judgement is 
only partly established... even 
if we go on to describe - in 
factual terms, and again with 
empirical evidence - the exact 
ways... in which he makes his
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stand against danger. For 
there will still be a question 
as to whether these ways are 
admirable ways. (61)
This argument, however, leads to the conclusion that 
in the last resort moral principles are nonrational. As 
Bertrand Russell at one time observed: "... questions of 
ends are not amenable to rational argument" (62N).
The "noncognitive" argument can be contrasted with
the following statement by Karl W. Deutsch in which he as­
serts that values depend upon knowledge, and therefore upon 
science:
... the knowledge of what ought 
to be cannot be divorced from 
the knowledge of what is... (63N)
' Deutsch’s argument obviously presupposes that there
is no 'systematic indeterminacy', or ’open-texture’ of
language; "facts are facts!"
The "noncognitive" metatheory has grave implications 
for those who ask: "Why this rule... rather than some other 
rule?" W.H. Walsh argues that a "noncognitivist"must be 
committed to the view that no objective historical know­
ledge is possible; it is irreducibly subjective (64), Every 
historian has his own viewpoint, and "since points of view 
are, ultimately, not matters of argument... we cannot say 
that one is 'objectively' better than another..." (65).
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Walsh also notes that there is no such thing as "the" 
evidence, "... historians have to decide what they are to 
treat as evidence..." (66) and if historians should decide 
something is not evidence, there is nothing anyone can do.
He also notes that comparisons between different versions 
of the same set of events are impossible from this (non­
cognitive) point of view (67), It was noted in chapter I 
that Blumer appeared ambivalent about history and histo­
rical continuity. If, as I claim, his position concerning 
moral principles is congruent with that of the 'noncognitive' 
theorists, then the historical aspect of social behavior 
cannot be scientifically objective (i.e. intersubjectively 
valid).
Blumer has been criticized for overemphasizing the
role of consciousness in human action, and the linguistic
philosophers have been criticized for overemphasizing the
rule-following aspect of language. Herbert Spiegelberg asks:
Who, especially in speaking his 
mother tongue, is even impli­
citly, let alone explicitly, 
aware of the rules of this 
language? (68)
Both of these criticisms suggest that many human acts 
are nonconscious, or at least are ones of which the actor is 
unaware. Spiegelberg takes the "whole emphasis on rules... 
to be something of a myth" (69). While it does appear
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ridiculous to suggest that the actor is aware of all the 
relevant linguistic rules each time he utters a statement, 
this does not refute the argument that language is rule- 
governed. Similarily, Blumer’s argument that a 'process 
of self-indication' is involved in every action is not re­
futed by showing that the actor is frequently unaware of 
the process. The question is whether he can become aware.
We have noted that everything for man is symbolic; 
and one of the possible results of 'symbolism' is a re­
duction in the mental effort required for any actions. 
Whitehead discusses the importance of symbolism in math­
ematics and observes that it frees the mind of unnecessary 
work and simplifies the procedures. He states that it is 
not desirable to think about what one is doing:
It is a profoundly erroneous 
truism... that we should cul­
tivate the habit of thinking 
of what we are doing. The 
Precise opposite is the case.
Civilization advances by ex­
tending the number of import­
ant operations which we can 
perform without thinking 
 ^ about them. (70N)
The process by which actions become 'automatic' has 
been termed "cognitive step-down transformation" (_71N).
There are, it would seem, different degrees of trans­
formation. The use of mathematical symbols 'automatically', 
for example, would appear to require a quite different
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degree of transformation than that involved in habit of 
walking with a slouch. The modification of one type of 
’automatic’ action may be much more difficult than that of 
another. There may be some areas of life in which it is 
as necessary to learn how to modify actions ’automatically’, 
as it is to learn how to perform actions ’automatically’.
For instance, in mathematics, the use of symbols ’auto­
matically' would seem to require also the ability to realize 
’automatically' that the values of the symbols change from 
situation to situation, equation to equation. Social 
interaction would be another area in which an inability to 
modify actions would be maladroit. That we do not ’think’ 
while performing some acts is no proof that we are unable to.
In this chapter we have explored the implications of 
Blumer’s notion that human action is essentially a "process 
of self-indication" and have suggested that the existence of 
this process seriously modifies the relationship commonly 
assumed to exist between language and ’reality’. The pro­
cess of self-indication has been shown to be a form of rule- 
following action, and, if it occurs in all human action as 
Blumer asserts, the study of social actions must employ 
concepts and methods that take into account the nature of 
rules. The following chapter will examine the question:
"Why this rule... rather than some other rule?" and will 
argue that rules, by their very nature, are not subsumable 
under "covering law explanations".
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NOTES: C h a p te r I I
1. Winch, 1967:15.
2. Wittgenstein, 1953:207. (in Chappell, 1962:74-100) An 
explication of Wittgenstein’s argument against the 
possibility of a private language is presented by 
Norman Malcolm, ’Wittgenstein’s Philosophical In­
vestigations", in Chappell, 1962:74-100)
3. Wittgenstein, 1953:124,
4. Wittgenstein's argument is complex and my refutation 
may be erroneous. Norman Malcolm admits that at times 
he only dimly understands Wittgenstein, (p 89)
5. Wittgenstein, 1953: paragraph 243. This point is 
explicated by Norman Malcolm (in Chappell, 1962)
6. A similar observation was made by P.F. Strawson in his 
review of Philosophical Investigations. (P.F. Strawson, 
"Critical Notice: Philosophical Investigations", Mind, 
LXIII. 1954, pp 70-99). However, many of Wittgenstein's 
statements refer to a private language in relation to 
pain. This relationship ;will not be discussed here. 
Inasmuch as Wittgenstein himself refers to the many 
different types of ’descriptions’, the exclusion of
a particular subject area is congruent with his philo­
sophical position. (Wittgenstein: paragraph 24).
7. Malcolm, 1962:76.
8. Wittgenstein, 1953 : paragraph 258. Winch also explicates 
this point. Winch, 1964:32.
9. Wittgenstein, 1953:paragraph 265.
10. Wittgenstein, 1953:paragraph 202, see also paragraph 380,
11. A brief discussion of the principle of intersubjectivity 
can be found in Bochenski. He observes:
According to the contemporary view 
one should as far as possible make 
use of such expressions as are re­
latively easy for others to verify.
When formulated in this way the 
rule holds good for all domains of
54
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11. knowledge and should be rigidly
applied. (Bochenski, 1968:57)
However, it may not be appropriate for all types of 
statements. See Hospers, 1967:260-275.
12. Blumer, 1969b:ll.
13. Quine, in discussing how a child learns to associate the 
sound "Mama" with the appearance of its mother, sug­
gests that "we must credit the child with a sort of pre- 
linguistic quality space", because: "He must, so to 
speak,sense more resemblance between some stimulations 
than between others. Otherwise a dozen reinforcements 
of his response ’red’ on occasions where red things
were presented, would no more encourage the same response 
to a thirteenth red thing than to a blue one". Quine, 
1960:83).
14. Harris, 1968:106.
15. For a brief discussion of ’stipulative definitions’ 
see Copi, 1968:97-98.
16. Bourke, 1970:144. See also the subsequent discussion 
in this thesis of Stevenson's "noncognitive" metaethical 
theory of ethics. Alston briefly discusses the dis­
tinction drawn between the ’cognitive' and ’emotive' 
meanings of statements. See Alston, 1964:74-75,102.
17. Urmson has presented an analysis of this process. See 
Urmson in Flew, 1965:381-409. Urmson discusses actions 
which are obviously acts of grading, e.g. grading apples; 
or which utilize the terms 'good', 'first class', 'bad', 
etc. He ignores the implicit grading process that oc­
curs whenever an actor 'notes' something, and he there­
fore asserts that a description is just a description,
(p 394). In asserting this he is overlooking the dis­
tinction between 'use' and 'mention;. The actor, in the 
act of describing something (and describing only some of 
the ’thing's’ manifold characteristics. See chapter 3) 
indicates that what he is saying is relevant to the 
situation; that it is, at least, more 'important', 
’relevant', 'significant', than saying and doing nothing.
18. Blumer, 1969b:110. He explicates this with reference to 
the effects of hunger pains upon the subsequent actions 
of an actor, pp 95-96.
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19. Rescher, 1964:8.
20. Harris, 1968:109.
21. This is a point Harris does not discuss. Alfred 
Schütz suggests that the use of the terms ’sub­
jective’ and ’objective' is unfortunate because 
"... the term ’objective meaning’ is obviously a 
misnomer in that the so-called ’objective’ inter­
pretations are in turn relative to the particular 
attitudes of the interpreters and therefore, in a 
certain sense, ’subjective’". Schütz, in Hook, 
1958:220)
22. Von Wright uses the word ’change' in this way:
"It is convenient, however, to use the word 
'change' so that it includes also non-changes..."
(Von Wright, in Rescher, The Logic of Decision 
mid Action : 121).
23. Quotation in Harris, 1968:105.
24. Thomas S. Kuhn, 1970:76.
25. Mitchell, 1970:156,139.
26. Burke, 1968:450.
27. Mitchell, 1970:152-153. "For the conventionalist 
claim is that we can get behind logic to that on 
which it rests". (p 152)
28. Watzlawick, 1967:65.
29. P.F. Strawson. Introduction to Logical Theorv.
London, 1952.
30. Mitchell, 1970:174.
31. Mitchell, 1970:151.
32. Mitchell, 1970:153-154.
33. Mitchell, 1970:155. However, there was a time when the
idea of zero, a number expressing nothing, was in­
conceivable. It may happen that a language lacking 
negation will be conceivable in the future.
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34. Quine, in discussing ’radical’ translation, observes:
Wanton translation can make 
natives sound as queer as 
one pleases. Better trans­
lation imposes our logic
upon them.~ [Quine, 1960:58, my emphasis)
35. Lindesmith and Strauss,1952:274. A.N. Whitehead ap­
pears to be in agreement with this position when he 
suggests that a puppy-dog "would have acted immediately 
upon the hypothesis of a chair... It is not a mere 
tropism, or automatic turning towards, because both 
men and puppies often disregard chairs when they see 
them". (Whitehead, 1959:4)
36. There has recently been developed, by G. Spencer Brown, 
a ’calculus of indications’, in which the idea of dis­
tinction is taken as given:
We take as given the idea of 
distinction and the idea of 
indication, and that we can­
not make an indication with­
out drawing a distinction. (Brown, 1969:1)
37. Whether the difference between animals and humans is 
qualitative is a controversial question. Leslie White 
discusses this question, presents the views of various 
scholars, and opts for a qualitative difference: "... 
animals cannot create or bestow new values", (pp 22-23) 
There are, however, problems in ascertaining when and 
if an animal has made an act of discrimination. It 
would seem that only if there is a repition can any 
given action be described as purposeful rather than 
random. It should be noted that use of the term 
’action’ with reference to animals often implies
•purposiveness. (Hamlyn, 1962:60-73)
The qualitative-quantitative dichotomy may be ir­
relevant: any language-using entity would need a 
considerable minimum complexity, depending upon the 
definition of language applied. This minimum level 
might appear as a qualitative difference.
38. Bochenski presents a brief discussion of syntactical 
and semantical relationships. Syntactic relation­
ships link words to one another, semantic relation­
ships relate words to objects. See Bochenski, 1968: 
32-34.
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39. Quine observes:
Pending a satisfactory explana­
tion of the notion of meaning, 
linguists in semantic fields 
are in the situation of not 
knowing what they are talking 
about. (Quine, 1963:47)
William Alston presents a brief review of the major 
theories of meaning. (Alston, 1964)
40. Quine, 1963:40.
41. Quine’s major work on this subject is Word and Object, 
published in 1960. This book, together with his many 
articles, have received much attention. In 1969, a 
number of essays concerning Quine’s work were col­
lected and published in book form. Words and Ob-
jactions : Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine., eds.
D. Davidson and J. Hintikka. Synthèse Library. 
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
42. Quine, 1963:11-12.
43. These two aspects of ’meaning’ are discussed by 
Alston, 1964:45-48.
44. Quine, 1963:49.
45. Quine, 1963:50,54. His analysis of ’significance’ 
shows that there is no way of specifying the suf­
ficient and necessary conditions of sentences that 
are ’significant’.
Mortimer Taube notes that Quine’s analysis makes a 
’transformational grammar’, specifically Chomsky’s, 
impossible. (Taube, 1961:57)
46. Quine, 1960:52.
47. Quine, 1960:64.
48. Quine, 1960:77. Some of the problems of translation 
were outlined by Malinowski in his article: "The 
Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages". He saw 
that no word for word translation was possible, but 
did not see that some of the problems of translation 
might be inherently insoluble. (Malinowski, 1923: 
296-236)
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49. Quine, 1960:78; my emphasis.
50. Quine, 1963:42. Quine’s argument is congruent in 
some respects with the Coherence theory of meaning:
"Our beliefs float free of fact, and the best we can 
do is to ensure consistency among them". (p 93)
Israel Scheffler, 1967: Science and Sub.jactivity. 
Scheffler’s book delineates the controversy between 
Coherence theorists and Correspondence theorists.
51. Quine, 1960:78. ’Analytical hypotheses’ are those 
that the linguist makes when he attempts to break up 
the native’s utterances into short ’words’, and which 
he then equates with English words or phrases. (Quine, 
1960:68,61-72)
52. Quine, 1960:77. The belief that it is useless to ask 
questions for which there are no criteria that can be 
used to evaluate answers is a characteristic of 
linguistic philosophy:
But the only presupposition which 
we must make is that if we have no 
criteria for evaluating answers to 
certain questions, then we should 
stop asking those questions until 
we do. (Rorty, 1967:14,4)
Quine’s work can be seen as part of a wide-spread 
philosophical controversy concerning the methods and 
problems of evaluating the validity of theories.
Thomas S. Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revo­
lutions , discusses some of the problems involved in 
assessing the validity of ’paradigms’. There have 
been many other studies on this subject, including 
Scheffler’s Science and Subjectivity. One of the 
more extreme views has been proposed by P.K. Feyerabend. 
He concludes that the problem of induction is insoluble. 
He also argues that well confirmed theories are not ne­
cessarily desirable. (Feyerabend, 1968:12-39)
53. Wegner, 1970:29.
54. The possibility of translating a statement into terms 
of sense-data has also been discussed by Friedrich 
Waisman. He claims that it has not been achieved be­
cause our empirical statements have an ’open texture’; 
that is, the terms which occur in it are non-exhaustive 
and we cannot therefore "foresee completely all the 
possible circumstances in which the statement is true
\.
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54. or in which it is false" (p.127). He suggests that the 
application of logic is limited; that the "...class of 
premises is not ’closed' and that therefore the con­
clusion is lacking stringency". This, he observes, is 
the same as saying "that S is not a logical consequence 
of the premises as far as they are stated". He con­
cludes:
We may say that the known rela­
tions of logic can only hold be­
tween statements which belong to 
a homogeneous domain; or that 
the deductive nexus never ex­
tends beyond the limits of such 
a domain. (Waisman, 1965:134)
55. There would seem to be at least two ways of viewing the 
’fact’ of ’systematic indeterminacy’:
A. "For if we have not been aware of 
the existence of a 'systematic 
indeterminacy’ in our own use of 
language, there is little reason 
to suppose that any other group 
will have perceived it".
B. "Since we have always believed in 
the "precision" of our own language 
we may well have assumed that other 
languages are equally ’precise’".
See Harris’s comments on kinship terminology, 
footnote 57.
56. As described by Charles 0. Frake in "The Ethnographic 
Study of Cognitive Systems". He states that it is 
important to determine the attributes that a group of 
natives use. His article appears in Readings in 
Anthropology, vol.2. Morton H. Fried ed., pp 82-95.
57. Marvin Harris discusses the inconsistencies that occur 
in Kinship terminology and argues that ambiguity may be 
a characteristic of kinship terms. (Harris, 1968:120)
58. Edmund Leach notes that Lévi-Strauss "tends to imply
... that the whole structure of primitive throught is 
binary" (p 129). Leach observes that even though dis­
tinctions are of the either/or kind, humans can still 
"cut up the cake of experience in quite different ways", 
(Leach, I970a:128)
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59. Hospers, 1967:225. However, they are frequently spoken 
of as being ’true’ or ’false’, e.g. if someone asserts 
that it is wrong to steal, a common reply would be:
"That’s true". See Stevenson, 1967:216-218)
60. Stevenson argues that the ’noncognitive’ (emotive) view 
is "a nonnormative meta-theory of norms, its business 
is not to make value judgments but only to survey and 
clarify them". (Stevenson, 1967:90)
61. Stevenson, 1967:222.
62. Russell, 1965:58. Russell defined three characteristics 
of reason: l) It relies upon persuasion rather than 
force; 2) It seeks to persuade by means of arguments 
which the man who uses them believes to be completely 
valid; 3) In forming opinions, it uses observation and 
induction as much as possible and intuition as little as 
possible. (Ibid: 55-56)
63. Deutsch, 1966:148. Within limited contexts, Deutsch’s 
argument may appear sound. For example, the decision to 
use pesticides must, it would seem, depend upon the 
severity of any known ’side-effects’,it does not follow 
that its use would be acceptable: religious or ethical 
beliefs concerning the sanctity of life might rule out 
its use as ’inconceivable’.
64. Walsh, 1958:110.
65. Walsh, 1958:113.
66. Walsh, 1958:116. See footnote 55, chapter I for Blumer’s 
very similar comments.
67. Walsh, 1958:115.
68. Spiegelberg, 1968:291.
69. Spiegelberg, 1968:292.
70. Whitehead, 1958:41-42. For a similar argument concerning 
the driving of cars and buses, see Lawrence LaFave, "The 
Concept of Involuntary Non-Conformity in Social Sciences", 
Symposia Studies Series of The National Institute of 
Social and Behavioral Sciences, 1968.
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71, LaFave, see previous footnote. LaFave also discusses 
this concept in "Involuntary Non-Conformity as a 
Function of Habit Lag", in Perceptual and Motor Skills, 
1967, no. 24. pp 227-234.
This process of cognitive step-down transformation 
may be a cultural universal; that is, a universal 
characteristic of man. However, as Leach observes 
(footnote 58) "the cake of experience" can be cut up 
in different ways: actions which are 'automatic’ in one 
society may not be in another.
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CHAPTER III 
DISTINCTIONS: DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION
Blumer’s emphasis upon the ’process of self-indica­
tion’ and his denial of any significant distinction between 
language and objects, was delineated in chapter I; some 
corroborating views of other scholars were presented in 
chapter II. The process of ’making a distinction’ was seen 
to be a form of rule-following, and some of the character­
istics of rule-governed behavior will be more clearly de­
lineated in this chapter (IN). The question still remains:
"Can Blumer’s symbolic interactionism be a science?" Blumer, 
it was noted, answers in the affirmative but implies that 
"fuller" descriptions might obviate the need for analytical 
explanations. While Blumer appears ambivalent concerning 
the need for theoretical explanations, another sholar, Peter 
Winch, who also saw social behavior as a form of rule-govern­
ed behavior, has firmly asserted that nomothetic explanations 
of social behavior are impossible. Some of Winch’s arguments, 
and criticisms thereof, will be considered in this chapter’ 
for the light that they may throw upon the description and 
explanation of social behavior. Although it is conceptually 
useful to distinguish ’descriptions’ from ’explanations’, it 
should be kept in mind that whereas ’explanations’ presuppose
63
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’descriptions', the reverse is not necessarily the case.
Whether symbolic interactionism can be a science 
will depend upon both the definition of the term ’science’ 
that is used and the nature of the 'process of self-indi­
cation;. The term ’.science’ has no clear denotation; the 
distinction between ’scientific’ and ’non-scientific’ 
activities is by no means precise. Michael Scriven ob­
serves that science, as an activity "... is continuous with 
the pre-scientific activities directed to the same ends" (2). 
Clifford Geertz suggests that there are close links between 
science, magic and religion:
Myth, and in a slightly different 
way, rite are systems that ... 
permit the construction of a 
’science of the concrete’ - the 
intellectual comprehension of 
- -■ the sensible world in terms of
sensible phenomena - which is no 
less rational, no less logical, 
no more affect-driven than the 
abstract science of the modern 
world. (3)
There are also differences of opinion as to the aims
of science. Purtill, in a recent article, suggests;
The basic aim of science is to 
give an organized account of 
whatever knowledge we can ob­
tain about the universe. (4N)
This statement is almost identical in content to 
Geertz’s statement; voiding the science - non-science 
dichotomy.
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Within more limited contexts, the term ’science’ is 
often used indiscriminately to refer to basic research, 
applied research or technology. Thomas S. Kuhn observes 
that the term ’science’ is usually reserved for those 
fields that do show progress, and that since progress is 
an obvious attribute of both science and technology, the 
profound differences between them are often ignored (5).
Kuhn emphasizes the difference between basic and applied 
research by observing that a great deal of resistance to 
Darwin’s concept of evolution was because his concept had 
no goal, in contrast to the many vague evolutionary schemes 
that were current at that time. Kuhn sees this non-goal 
orientation as an essential characteristic of basic re­
search and suggests that if we substitute "evolution-from- 
what-we-know" for "evolution-toward-what-we-wish-to-know", 
a ’number of vexing problems may vanish in the process" (6). 
One of Kuhn’s more important points is that he denies the 
commonly assumed relationship between science and ’truth’.
He states that the concept of truth is not relevant to 
scientific validity. The process of verification involves 
choosing between alternative solutions at a given time:
Whether that choice is the best 
that could have been made if 
still other alternatives had 
been available, or if the data 
had been of another sort is 
not a question that can use­
fully be asked. (7N)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
There is, however, some controversy concerning the 
criteria that a ’scientific’ explanation should fulfill.
The argument that has commanded the most respect is the 
one put forward by Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim (8),
This is termed the ’covering-law’ model: a ’deductive-
nomological’ model (9N) Hempel’s model involves nine 
propositions, according to Krimmerman (10),of which the 
fifth states that a scientific explanation, in order for 
it to be acceptable, must subsume the event to be ex­
plained under general laws. Hempel states:
... all scientific explanations 
and their everyday counterparts 
claim or presuppose at least im­
plicitly the deductive or induc­
tive subsumability of whatever 
is to be explained under general 
laws or theoretical principles.
(11)
Hempel observes that in developing his model, he
was attempting to construct a nonpragmatic model:
... the problem of constructing 
a nonpragmatic conception of 
sciencentific explanation - a 
conception that requires re­
ference to puzzled individuals 
no more than does the concept 
of mathematical proof - is 
... (12)
While there are many criticisms of the covering- 
law model, and many problems of the epistemology of laws 
(13N), Hempel suggests that many of his critics "miss their 
aim because they apply to nonpragmatic concepts of explana­
tion certain standards that are proper only for a pragmatic 
construal" (14),
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Hempel’s model is valid if, and only if, the dis­
tinction between pragmatic and nonpragmatic is valid in 
relation to scientific explanations (as distinct from a 
logistic system; an uninterpreted calculus). In other 
words, if all scientific explanations are irreducibly 
pragmatic the objections of his critics may be valid (15N), 
The discussion in chapter II concerning Quine’s ’systematic 
indeterminacy’, and the reference to Waisman’s ’open- 
texture’, suggests that scientific explanations may re­
fer to individuals in some way (16N).
A scientific explanation does not ’explain’ some 
’thing’ which is ’out-there’ in all pristine purity and 
totality. It explains a description of a ’state of af­
fairs’ or an ’event’, and descriptions refer only to a 
part of the ’event’. Morgenbesser states:
Let us begin by emphasizing the 
trivial point that we never ex­
plain an event as such, but only 
selected aspects of it. In 
other words, it is not the event 
itself that is explained but the 
event under a given description.
(17)
The words used in a description, for example the 
word ’tree’, are general words: they refer to a class of 
’events’, not to a particular ’event’. If, as seems like­
ly, there are no two things exactly alike, then when we
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use the word ’tree’ in an observation-statement we have 
classified some ’thing’ according to certain similarities 
that it is perceived as sharing with other ’things’ (IBN).
If our explanation is to be nonpragmatic, then it is es­
sential that our process of classification be nonpragmatic. 
The process of classifying requires a knowledge of the "bond 
by which members of a class are supposed to cohere together" 
(19)
Satosi Watanabe, in a recent essay on pattern recogni­
tion, observes that the relation of ’similarity’ is the major 
factor used in classification. He then proves that there can 
be no logical basis for the idea of similarity (20N), From 
this he deduces the Ugly Duckling Theorem:
Any pair of two objects are as 
similar to each other as are any 
other pair of two objects (21)
Watanabe’s theorem would appear to severely limit the 
validity of Hempel’s model (22N),
If classification is a logically arbitrary process, 
Watanabe’s Ugly Duckling Theorem appears also to put a limit 
upon the development of covering-law explanations of pheno­
mena which are Emically classified, i.e. the cognitive stu­
dies of the ethnosemantlcists and of Lévi-Strauss, parti­
cularly if we bear in mind Ayer% distinction between 
’generalizations of fact’ and ’generalizations of law’ (23N).
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The extent to which a classification scheme can be
’logically arbitrary’ is well illustrated in the following
taxonomy, reputed to be of ancient Chinese origin:
... animals are divided into: a) 
belonging to the Emperior, b) em­
balmed, c) tame, d)suckling pigs, 
e) mermaids, f) fabulous, g)dogs 
running free, h) included in the 
present classification, i) which 
behave like madmen, j) innumer­
able, k) drawn on camel-skin 
with a very fine brush, l) et 
cetera, m) which have just broken 
their leg, n) which from a dis­
tance look like flies. (24N)
Watanabe’s Theorem, of course, corroborates in­
directly Blumer’s assertion that there may be different 
’objects’ for different people; different ’worlds’ for 
different groups (25),
Peter Winch, in his book The Idea of a Social Science 
(26), also stressed the rule-following characteristics of 
social behavior. Winch presents a number of arguments, of 
which the following three will be discussed: 1) a nomothetic 
science of human behavior is impossible (27), 2) it is ne­
cessary to understand the ’mode of discourse’ (the language) 
of the group being studied (28), 3) the method of philo­
sophical analysis (conceptual analysis) is necessary in 
order to understand a mode of social life (29N).
There have been many criticisms of Winch’s arguments, 
but one in particular seems to be more important than the
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Others: the criticism that Richard S. Rudner presents in 
his "Philosophy of Social Sciences" (SON). Rudner focuses 
upon the second and third arguments listed above. However, 
his criticism occurs within a chapter concerning the ob­
jectivity of social science, in which he also discusses 
Emergentism and delineates two uses of the term ’meaning­
ful’. He earlier presented, and affirmed, Hempel's covering- 
law model of explanation. Rudner claims to refute Winch’s 
second argument by showing that it is a subtle form of the 
’reproductive fallacy’ (31) and he assumes that the third 
argument also falls because it is dependent on the validity 
of the second. Rudner does not explicitly discuss Winch’s 
first argument (above), but he does claim to refute the 
argument for emergence: which is, of course. Winch’s first 
argument. Rudner’s discussion is complex and it will be 
easier, and perhaps clearer, if Winch’s argument against 
the possibility of a nomothetic social science is presented 
first, and then compared with Rudner's refutation of Emer­
gentism.
Winch asserts that science studies uniformities and 
that "... statements of uniformities' presuppose judgments 
of identity" (32). He observes that the criteria of uni­
formity (sameness) that the sociologist must use are those 
that are specified by the group that he is studying,(i.e.
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Ernie criteria) (33). In other words, whereas the natural 
scientist studies 'reality’, the sociologist can only 
study those aspects of ’reality’ - that ’meaningless in­
finity of the world process’ - that are selected by the 
group he is studying. Winch continues by observing that 
these rules (criteria) are based on a social context of 
common activity (34), and asserts that voluntary behavior
i.e. social behavior, is "behavior to which there is an 
alternative" (35N), He concludes that behavior has a 
characteristic different from that of the movements of 
matter:
... the central concepts which 
belong to our understanding of 
social life are incompatible 
with concepts central to the 
activity of scientific pre­
diction. (36)
Winch’s conclusion is also corroborated by Wata­
nabe’s Ugly Duckling Theorem: if there is no logical basis 
in ’similarity’ there can be no ’generalization of law’ 
concerning what is to count as similar from one group to 
the next, from one individual to another, or indeed, from 
one point in time to the next.
Rudner first presents the ’hypothesis’ of absolute 
Emergentism (37N), and then claims to refute it by merely 
asserting that no one has ever come close to proving it 
(38N).. Absolute Emergentism is, he states, the belief that:
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... some events are, in prin­
ciple, unpredictable (i.e., 
there are events the predic­
tion of which is logically 
impossible), since they are 
not connected with other 
events in any lawlike fashion.
(39)
If we acknowledge that events are not ’events' i.e. 
that we must select in our descriptions (Morgenbesser), 
then Watanabe’s proof appears to be a proof of absolute 
emergence in ’similarity’ (40N).
The central concept of Blumer, the ’process of 
self-indication’ is also, for the same reasons, an emer­
gent process; that is, the ’distinctions’ that have been 
encoded in a language are emergent because there is no 
logical basis for the way in which ’similarities’ have 
been clustered and the distinctions (redefinitions) that 
the actor makes are emergent for the same reasons (i.e. 
’distinction A ’ and ’distinction B ’ of Chapter II).
The two other arguments of Winch (#2 and #3) can be 
inferred from the conjunction of Quine’s analysis of 
language and Winch's earlier statement that "the con­
cepts we have settle for us the form of the experience 
we have of the world " (41). Briefly, if the majority of 
the ’words’ of a language are not conditioned to stimuli, 
and if the ’words’ (concepts of a language determine the
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way in which the 'natives' see the world, then it is essen­
tial to learn that language in order to attempt to describe 
their world view. (There are limitations and problems as 
Quine stresses). Winch's third argument follows because some 
form of 'conceptual analysis', i.e. knowledge of synonyms, is 
involved in learning any language. Winch did not assert, in 
argument 3, that philosophical analysis was sufficient as well 
necessary (42).
Rudner, however, did not interpret Winch's arguments (#2 
and #3 above) in the same way that I have. He has some justi­
fication because Winch goes into a discussion of Weber's 
'Verstehen' concept (43N), in which Winch asserts that statis­
tical data alone are not sufficient to validate an 'interpre­
tation' of a rule (44N). Winch argues that 'understanding' in­
volves "grasping the point or meaning of what is being said or 
done" (45). Winch's argument is not particularly lucid as he 
does not indicate that there are two ways, at least, of looking 
at rule-following behavior: from the point of view of a logi­
cian or from the viewpoint of an ethnographer (or linguist). 
Winch uses the logician's approach, i.e. Wittgenstein’s. The 
logician emphasizes that the use of a rule is an all or nothing 
affair; one either 'gets the point’ or one doesn’t, e.g. "Either 
I 'see' (or 'it strikes me') that the consequence follows or I 
fail to see it". (Mitchell, 1970:63), see also Foucault's re­
mark concerning the Chinese taxonomy: footnote 24). This is 
the aspect of rule learning that Winch is stressing in his 
argument and for this aspect statistics are irrelevant. How-
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ever, from the linguist's viewpoint, in order for him to know 
that he has described a rule that the majority of the 'natives' 
use, he must, of course, 'count heads'. That is, in general, 
and in particular, from Quine's discussion and from Blumer's 
'redefinition of the situation* concept, any single actor may em­
ploy a rule that is not common to many, or any of the other 'na­
tives': this does not reduce the rule's 'validity' for the actor, 
but does reduce its 'significance' for the linguist.
Rudner, not seeing that Winch is using the logician's ap­
proach, claims that Winch argues for the necessity of a 'direct 
experience' of the subject matter, and he therefore asserts that 
Winch is committing the "reproductive fallacy" (46N). (Winch 
does, of course, argue for a 'direct experience', but only in 
the sense of learning a language: a 'game').
Rudner's discussion of 'objectivity* is also obscure because 
he shifts from considering the possibility of scientific ex­
planations (Hempel's covering-law explanations) to considering 
the possibility of validating observation-statements; that is, 
to answering the question:
(is) "X is valued or judged to be 
important by Y)... logically imper­
vious to validation through the 
scientific method? (47)
The obscurity occurs in his usage of 'the scientific method'. 
Whatever this may mean, it does not refer to Hempel's covering- 
law model because Hempel's theory does not discuss the validation 
of observation-statements. Neither does Rudner explain what this 
'method' involves, except by indirect references to the principle 
of inter-subjectivity (48N).
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Furthermore, Rudner fails to differentiate between 
’use’ and ’mention’ in his discussion of the term ’meaning­
ful'. He delineates two usages of this term: a semantical 
(nonevaluational) use or sense, and an 'evaluational' usage. 
The latter usage occurs when the speaker is referring to the 
"importance or value" that things have. Rudner then assumes 
that since we can differentiate two 'types' of 'meaningful' 
when we talk about the term (which of course is possible), 
we can therefore argue that an actor can use either 'sense' 
independently of the other. This is not the case, as was 
shown in chapter II. In Blumer's terms, the actor must 
choose each time he acts (which includes speaking) and this 
means that when the actor 'reaffirms' an existing distinction 
(definition) he is attaching 'importance' to the distinction. 
He could have rejected it, and it is likely that he had a 
number of possible 'definitions' to choose from.
Rudner acknowledges that the 'evaluational' usage is 
important in the argument that asserts that the "... valu- 
ational predicates that occur in social science theories or 
hypotheses are not definable by any set of observation pre­
dicates" (49). The reverse of this: that no valuational 
predicates can be derived from observation predicates, is 
the argument against naturalistic ethics: which is Blumer's 
"moral principles are human constructs" argument (50N).
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The focus of this chapter has been the question 
"Why this rule?" (51N). It has been claimed here that there 
can be no theoretical covering-law explanations of rule- 
following behavior. It may be helpful at this point to 
examine the game of chess, as an example of rule-following 
behavior (52N), and delineate what a covering-law explanation 
of chess would require. There are, in our culture, "chess 
masters", but no "chess scientists!"
Perhaps the first thing to note about chess is that 
it is not legitimate to assume that the rules continue un­
changed from game to game (53N), A survey of this campus 
would show that the rules often change, even within 'one 
game'. Michael Scriven attempted to delineate an example 
of essential unpredictability by constructing a 'guessing' 
game. His example was analyzed by Patrick Suppes, who 
showed that as long as the game is known probabilistic pre­
dictions can be made. However, Suppes asserts that the game 
must not be changed:
... it is important to emphasize 
that prior to the analysis of the 
predictability of C's moves, we 
must fix upon the game that C is 
playing... If, in fact, they 
are not playing this game but 
some other game, then what is to 
be said about predictability must 
be changes. (54)
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The rules of chess are such that it is logically 
impossible to learn them all from the observation of one 
game (55N). A covering-law explanation would require that 
the rules of chess, since they 'cannot explain themselves' 
(Goldstein), be determined by some 'law', and such a 'law' 
would have to explain the variations that occur between 
Persian chess, Chinese chess, American chess; and of course, 
all the variations that can be observed on this campus, and 
elsewhere.
Chess, or at least the chess game approved by the 
International Chess authorities, has been extensively ana­
lyzed. There are reams of books. However, a change of 
even one rule relegates all previous analyses to the his­
torians; they are no longer valid analyses. For example, 
there is a rumor among chess players that the 'pawn' may be 
allowed to move one square backwards, as well as forwards. 
The pawn is the lowest valued unit on the board, yet this 
modification would completely change the tactics and stra­
tegies of the chess game. All previous discussions of the 
value or importance of certain moves or positions would be 
invalid. New analyses might of course confirm sone of the 
previous analyses, but until that time it would not be 
possible to answer the question "Is X a good position 
(move)?"
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The game of chess would appear to be much less complex 
than the ’game’ of life, or the 'game* of language, yet the 
number of possible moves in chess is so great that it is 
not feasible to programme a computer to evaluate all the 
possible moves in any one game. This being the case, Winch's 
statement that "the concepts we have settle for us the ex­
perience we have of the world" must be interpreted figura­
tively. Polanyi has drawn attention to the very large number 
of permutations that can be developed from the twenty-six 
letters of the alphabet (56). A similar operation is pos­
sible, to some degree, with concepts. For example, the 
'wings' of a bird may be, in the imagination, attached to 
a horse, thereby creating a Pegasus figure. Similarly 
'hard' and 'radiation' can be combined in 'hard radiation': 
a combination that the usual usage of the term 'hard' does 
not imply. There is, of course, an additional "creative" 
element, over and above permutation, which enables the 
actor to attach 'significance' to aspects of the 'world' 
which had not previously been significant.
There remains the problem of validating observation 
statements. Rudner asks whether the statement "X is valued 
or judged important by Y" can be validated by the scientific 
method. The term "validate" can, as has been discussed, re­
fer to two different processes: the validation of a statement
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that an individual Y values X, or the validation of the 
statement that a group Y values X. In the first case,’ 
the veracity of the statement ultimately requires Y to 
answer in the affirmative. That this is the case follows 
from the ’fact’ that X is a description of a 'state of af­
fairs, and as such the description has neither intrinsic 
significance nor a one-to-one correspondence to any 'thing'. 
The same description can 'refer' to more than one 'state of 
affairs', and different descriptions can 'refer' to the same 
'state of affairs' (57N). There may be times when observa­
tion of behavior alone will indicate whether Y values X, but 
only if X is a common Ernie description of a 'state of af­
fairs'. For example, if I make a silent resolution to stop 
smoking cigarettes, the modification of my behavior will be 
noticed by my friends and probably by an observer; but only 
because the smoking/non-smoking distinction is significant 
within this society. However, suppose that I make a silent 
resolution always to hold a cup with my little finger held 
straight. There may be societies where the position of 
one's little finger when drinking from a cup is significant, 
but the campus culture here is not one of them. In this 
case, neither my friends nor the observer would detect 
this behavior modification, because the 'state of affairs' 
to which I attach significance is not significant to others.
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Even when X appears to be a common ’state of affairs’, 
observation alone, i.e. no communication, will probably 
attach significance to the wrong elements (see Sapir, foot­
note 35, chapter II). Even when the language is known, 
Quine’s analysis indicates that there will remain some 
’systematic indeterminacy’: but the language of the ’natives’ 
must be known in order to describe those aspects of a situa­
tion that they consider significant.
The validation of the statement concerning a group 
involves all the previous problems plus the problem of 
’counting heads’. Should the population be large, sampling 
methods may have to be used.
There are two further aspects of the process of vali­
dation that warrant some discussbn. The first concerns the 
validation of our evaluations (i.e. Etic evaluations) of 
the similarities, or differences, between the ’rules’ of 
other groups. At least two anthropologists have written 
articles on this subject: Macbeath sees many differences 
between cultures, while Mead sees many similarities (58).
The Ugly Duckling Theorem implies that there can be no 
’validation’: there is no logical basis in 'similarities’. 
The only criterion is the criterion of consensus. There 
can be no other (59N).
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The second point about validation concerns the problem 
of 'exceptions’. These may be of various types: a) there is 
an individual member of a tribe who makes a new distinction, 
e.g. "Two Crows" interchanges the Z and A of the alphabet 
(60N); b) all cultures except one or two have both a high 
degree of stratification and slavery (61N); c ) the 'ideal' 
culture prescribes polygamy but the 'actual' culture is 
predominantly monogamous (62N). To the extent that these 
'exceptions' concern rule-governed behavior, they cannot 
be theoretical problems: rule-governed behavior not being 
subsumable under covering-laws. Obviously there can be 
exceptions, i.e. deviancy from prescribed laws, but this 
is not the point. There may be problems in ascertaining 
the extent of the 'exceptions', i.e. 'counting heads', but 
this is a statistical problem, not a theoretical one (63N).
The preceding discussion has concerned only those 
parts of social behavior that are rule-governed. Although 
anthropologists have delinated behavioral 'traits' which 
they say are cultural universals, there is some disagree­
ment as to the validity and explanatory power of this 
dichotomy between cultural universals and cultural par­
ticulars' (64N). Melvin M, Tumin recently observed that 
patterns of behavior cannot be explained by biological 
instincts or psychological drives. The factors he
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delineates all refer to values, or to synonyms of values;
The patternings of motives, 
forms, and consequences - are 
the products of ideologies, 
values, interests, resources, 
world views, and philosophies, 
and they change continuously...
(65N).
While the Ugly Duckling Theorem has been the main
analytical tool of this chapter, the analysis could just
as easily have been drawn from a study of Polanyi, Quine,
Waisman, and Ayer, etc. The following quotation expresses,
in different words, the central place that 'value* has in
the study of human behavior:
An order is an arrangement with 
respect to which it would matter 
If it were otherwise. And this 
holds for order in science, in 
art, in civil life, whereever in 
fact the concept applies... The 
question about order, then, is 
not why things should be dis­
posed in a certain way, but why 
it should matter that they are 
disposed in this way. And that 
transforms the question into a 
question about value. (66N)
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NOTES: C h a p te r I I I
1. This is not to deny that there are areas of social
behavior which may not be rule-governed. See sub­
sequent discussion.
2. Scriven, 1968:84.
3. Geertz, 1968,:404-405.
4. Purtill, 1970:306. Purtill claims that it is now 
generally agreed that the aim of science is to ex­
plain, but he wonders if this is a description of 
what scientists do, or advice as to what they should 
do.
5. Kuhn, 1970:160-161.
6. Kuhn, 1970:171-172.
7. Kuhn, 1970:146,170 ff. He also notes: "Philosophers 
of science have repeatedly demonstrated that more 
than one theoretical construction can always be 
placed upon a given collection of data... it is not 
even very difficult to invent such alternatives (in 
early stages of a new science) p. 76. (See also 
note 54, chapter II)
8. Carl G . Hempel and Paul Oppenheim. "Studies in the 
Logic of Explanations", in Philosophy of Science, 
Vol.15, No.2, April, 1948. Reprinted in The Bobbs 
Merrill Reprint Series in Philosophy, Phil - 100. 
Hempel*s most recent exposition in Aspects of Sci- 
entific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philo­
sophy of 'Science. New York: The Free Press, 1965.
9. Hempel speaks of two models in some essays. These 
are the 'deductive-nomological* and the ’inductive 
probabilistic’. (See Krimmerman, 1969:137).
Hempel considers the ’inductive probabilistic’ - 
model to be of less significance. This is, however, 
a controversial position and Hans Reichenbach has 
argued extensively that all knowledge is based on 
probability. (See Reichenback, 1961) The analysis 
in this thesis is based on Hempel’s ’deductive- 
nomological’ model, but it is acknowledged that a
83
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9. complete analysis would include the probabilistic 
model. This has not been attempted here because 
the probabilistic model is itself subject to 
controversy.
10. Krimmerman, 1969:43-45.
11. Hempel, 1965:425.
12. Hempel, in Krimmerman, 1969:135.
13. Krimmerman’s volume, 750 pages, is only a small part 
of the writings concerning scientific explanations. 
A.J. Ayer distinguishes ’generalizations of fact’ 
and 'generalizations of law’, and discusses the 
criteria that might be used to distinguish them. He 
asserts that we in fact, distinguish them, but 
our criteria are unclear.
Karl R. Popper differentiates 'laws’ from 
'trends'. Universal laws do not assert existence 
whereas trends do assert existence (115). "Explained 
trends do exist, but their persistence depends upon 
the persistence of certain specific initial condi­
tions." (p 128) A trend may change overnight. He 
claims that historicists assume that trends are un­
conditional and states that the poverty of the 
historicists is a poverty of the imagination; they 
are unable to "imagine a change in the conditions 
of change". (Popper, 1957:130)
14. Hempel, in Krimmerman, 1969:136.
15. Stephens M. Dietz, in a recent article, discusses 
some of the pragmatic aspects of Hempel’s model.
He shows that Dray’s notion of ’explaining how-pos- 
sibly' is a special sort of ’explanation-sketch’ and 
confirms Hempel’s thesis. Dietz erroneously assumes 
that Hempel claims to be descriding what scientists 
actually do "... for he (Hempel) would not have given 
us any realistic account of what scientists usually 
do." (p 616) Compare this with Hempel’s statement: 
"... we can also dismiss the complaint that the 
covering-law models do not, in general, accord with 
the manner in which working scientists actually 
formulate their explanations," (because the scientists 
direct their explanations to a particular audience) 
(Hempel in Krimmerman: 136) (Dietz, 1970:614-617)
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16. Polanyi*s concept of ’tacit* knowledge also relates 
scientific explanations to ’individuals’. (Polanyi, 
1967)
17. Morgenbesser, 1968:121.
18. Hospers discusses the need for general words and 
notes that the ’act of classifying is the work of 
human beings. (Hospers, 1967:45.47) Copi states 
that classification schemes are hypotheses which 
group ’important’ characteristics. His criteria 
of ’important’ characteristics is: "involved in a 
greater number of causal laws..." (Copi, 1963: 
409-410) Neither gives a proof that classifica­
tion is nonlogical.
19. Watanabe, 1969:526.
20. Watanabe, 1969:526. He outlines his procedure in 
this essay but refers to his other essays forlhe 
proof.
21. Watanabe, 1969:526.
22. A scientific explanation must be about ’events’
(i.e. descriptions of events) and must therefore
be expressed in an interpreted calculus, and inter­
pretation will be logically arbitrary according to
Watanabe. See footnote 40.
23. See note 13, chapter III. Ayer gives the following 
as an example of a ’generalization of fact’: "...
All the Presidents of the Third French Republic are 
male". For ’generalization of law" he states: "the
planets of our solar system move in elliptical
orbits". (Ayer, 1970:39,48)
24. Caws, 1970:208. Caws excerpted this quotation from 
Michael Foucault’s "Les Mots et les Choses". The 
quotation from Foucault continues: "In our astonish­
ment at this taxonomy what strikes us... is... the 
stark impossibility of thinking that". Foucault ap­
parently believes this taxonomy to be a figment of 
Borge’s imagination.
25. Blumer, 1969b:ll.
26. Published in 1958.
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27. Winch, 1967:94.
28. Winch, 1967:110,15.
29. Winch, 1967:113. The analysis involves "the as­
sertion of equivalence between two expressions". 
(Urmson, 1956:116) Urmson states that conceptual 
analysis involves the problems of synonomy, vague­
ness, ambiguity, etc.
30. Rudner’s book is inexpensive and is also one of a
paperback series on philosophy: "Foundations of
Philosophy Series".
31. Rudner, 1966:83.
32. Winch, 1967:83.
33. Winch, 1967:86-87.
34. Winch, 1967:84.
35. Winch, 1967:91. Compare with Toynbeejs statements;
I therefore think that a formula 
such as "challenge and response" 
is a more realistic approach to 
the study of human affairs, p 56.
A single cause must have a single 
uniform effect every time that this 
cause comes into operation. But a 
challenge may have at least two 
responses, I will or I won't, and 
it may have quite a number of 
variations. (Toynbee, 1968:57)
36. Winch, 1967:94.
37. Rudner, 1966:71. He dismisses Relative Emergence 
(the belief that it is not technically possible to 
predict at this time) by noting that although it 
"is doubtless true, it does not imply that any 
social phenomena are closed to investigation by 
means of the scientific method." (p 71}
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38. Michael Polanyi has always argued for the necessity 
of 'emergent theories’ in the study of human affairs 
(and in biology). Although I have few references to 
his works, my interest in Emergence has been greatly 
stimulated by his writings. In particular by Personal 
Knowledge : Towards a_ Post-Critical Philosophv.
39. Rudner, 1966:71.
40. This is not a restriction to the natural scientist. 
They agree to 'select' only certain aspects of 
’things’ to study. (See Polanyi, 1964:13-17,163 ff, 
292-294)
41. Winch,1967:15.
42. Winch, 1967:118. Statistics "might form part of the 
argument" (re validity).
43. There have been many ’interpretations' of "Verstehen". 
A recent article by Warringer, while initially murky, 
does approach the delineation that I present here. 
(Warringer, 1969)
44. Winch, 1967:113. Inasmuch as Winch, in this para­
graph, suggests that statistics are somewhat rele­
vant, he clouds the issue. Rudner takes Winch to 
be saying that they (statistics) are 'wholly ir­
relevant", and for learning a rule, they are ir­
relevant, as is explained.
45. Winch, 1967:115. Italics in original.
46. Rudner, 1966,:82-83. The ’reproductive fallacy’ in­
volves the belief (fallacious) that science is sup­
posed to 'reproduce' 'reality'. Rudner quotes 
Einstein: "... it is not the function of science 
’to give the taste of the soup"', p 69. It should 
be noted that Winch explicitly rejects any ’inner- 
sense’ type of Verstehen. (See p 119)
47. Rudner, 1966:79.
48. For example: "... to provide the empathizer with a 
reliable basis for accepting or rejecting his hypo­
thesis about the phenomenon he is investigating. We 
must have established independently that the empathy 
is . .7" ("Rudner, 1966:73, my emphasis)
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49. Rudner, 1966:80.
50. A sociologist, Christopher G.A. Bryant, has re­
cently responded to some of Winch's arguments 
(and, he claims, to some of the arguments of 
MacIntyre and Louch). His discussion is somewhat 
confused as he does not clearly distinguish be­
tween the criteria needed for scientific explana­
tions and those needed for validation of obser- 
vation-statements. He attempts, among other 
things, to classify social phenomena into cate­
gories, ordered as to their susceptibility to 
causal analysis (p 101). Of the three cate­
gories, the first category, the one most amen­
able to causal analysis, includes ’age-structure' 
as an example. He subsequently asserts: "Socio­
logists can identify these phenomena according
to the characteristics they themselves attribute 
to them because they exist independently of any 
human conception of them", (p 103)
I do not understand what Bryant means. It 
seems as if he is saying that there are babies, 
older babie , young children, older children, etc., 
in all societies; but this is not to state that all 
societies change their classification categories at 
the same chronological age, nor to state that the 
'appropriate' behavior for any 'age-grade' is the 
same in all societies. (All babies, I admit, do 
apparently make sucking motions when very young!) 
Category 2 uses "class" and :language" as examples. 
Category 3 is for rule-following actions. He does 
not show clearly how the 'behavior' of categories 
1 and 2 is not rule-following. He does assert: 
"Laws in natural science are supposed to be time­
less and unchanging. Many 'laws' in social science 
are principles which explain what occurs, and they 
continue to work until they are reflected upon and 
if need be challenged... The principles are not 
challenged that often", (p 102; (Compare this to 
The Povertv of Historicism, footnote 13, this 
chapter). (Bryant, 1970:95-107)
51. R. Brown observes that it is obvious that social 
behavior is rule-conforming and asserts that the 
social scientist "... is impelled to ask 'Why 
this intention...? or 'Why this rule...?' and 
the chain of answers will soon enough depend on
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51. referring to neither goals nor rules for its ex­
planatory power". (Brown, 1963:98)
A similar observation was made by Goldstein 
in his review of Winch’s book. Goldstein states: 
"... if I want to account for the existence of an 
institution, or if I want to explain the existence
in this society of some particular rule, I cannot
appeal to the rule to explain itself ... To explain
the presence of institutions, I must be able to
specify the conditions which give them rise ... it 
is clear.that if he (the sociologist) is not per­
mitted to go beyond the given rules he cannot ex­
plain them, (p 333) (Winch, of course, is arguing 
that the sociologist is not able to go beyond the 
rules). (Goldstein, 1960:332-333)
52. There can be more than one type of ’rule’; Von
Wright delineates three types. It may well be that
each type of rule requires, or is associated with, a
different type of rule-following behavior. (Von
Wright, 1963: ch.l)
53. A mistake that Ryle makes. He assumes constancy: 
"After much research tils spectator will have worked 
out all the rules of chess ... (Ryle, 1968:75, my 
emphasis)
54. Suppes, 1969:286-287.
55. The game can end either in ’check-mate' or ’stale­
mate’, but not both (ignoring the act of conceding).
56. Polanyi, 1964:78.
57. ’Morning Star', 'Evening Star' and 'Venus’ are ex­
amples often used in philosophical literature.
58. Alexander Macbeath. The Relationship of Primitive 
Morality and Religion. London: Macmillan, 1949. 
Margaret Mead. "Some Anthropological Considerations 
Concerning Natural Law", in Natural Law Forum, vi, 
1961, pp 51-64. These works are referred to by 
Vernon J. Bourke. History of Ethics, Vol.2, Image 
Books, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968, 
1970, p 155.
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59. In Stevenson's terms, a "disagreement in belief" can­
not be resolved by reference to’facts’.
60. Edward Sapir notes that any deviation from the norm can
become the norm, and suggests that the ultimate criterion 
of "value interpretation" is "... nothing more than con­
sensus of opinion" (p 572). He also discusses the prob­
lem of one informer denying what another has affirmed, 
and Sapir appears to opt for a statistical resolution: 
the majority rule. (Sapir, 1963:569-577)
61. A.J.F. Kobben discusses some of the problems of cross- 
cultural research. He does not present any theoretical 
solutions but notes that many anthropological terms are 
too monolithic: they cover a multitude of sins. (Kobben, 
1967:3-34)
62. Hugo G. Nutini discusses this problem in an article 
concerning Lévi-Strauss. He claims that descriptions 
of both the ’ideal’ (Mechanical in Lévi-Strauss’ termi­
nology) and the actual (statistical) should be con­
structed, but asserts that the statistical ’model’ should 
be subordinated to the mechanical (p 95): "... mechanical 
models are always heuristically superior to statistical 
models..." (p 95). He, however, does not offer any 
explanation of why the mechanical model is superior, or 
in what way it expiai s ’more’ than the statistical 
model. (Nutini, 1970:70-107)
63. Herbert Dingle discusses the relationship between 
statistical knowledge and causal knowledge. His 
example concerns the number of unaddressed envelopes 
that are mailed each year in England: the proportion 
remains constant from year to year. He states:
[the statistical information] is some­
thing superposed on the causal and, so 
far as we can see, not dependent on it 
at all... we cannot even begin to ex­
press one in terms of the other with­
out destroying them... we have here 
two essentially different kinds of 
regularity, one applicable to single 
events and the other to collections 
of similar events... (and it is de­
lusion to attempt to explain either 
in terms of the other). (Dingle,
1970:235-236)
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64. Murdock finds cultural universals valuable, while 
Geertz argues that they are of no value. (G.P. 
Murdock, 1947: "The Common Denominator of Culture". 
(Clifford Geertz, 1965: "The Impact of the Concept 
of Culture on the Concept of Man".
65. Melvin M. Tumin, 1970:21. Tumin also asserts that 
power determines the tenacity and initiation of 
patterns of behavior.
66. Caws, 1968:106. Carl J. Friedrich, in the same 
volume asserts:
Conflicts of principle are at the 
very essence of political order...
There never has been any resolution 
of their contradictions, and there 
never will be any resolution in 
terms of any order of priority.
(Friedrich, 1968:343). Kuntz, in the Introduction, 
states: "There emerges a concensus among authorities. 
No one of them considers the moral order derivative 
from the natural order... In a word, they all defend 
the autonomy and irreducibility of the moral order", 
(p.XXVIII).
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CHAPTER IV
SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
The analyses presented in the previous chapters have 
shown that there can be no covering-law theories concerning 
rule-governed behavior (1). This does not mean that socio­
logy requires only conceptual analysis, which was one of 
Winch’s conclusions. Winch failed, as was shown, to dis­
tinguish between the logician’s approach and the ethno­
grapher’s approach: the ethnographer must discover the ex­
tent of any rule. (Winch may, of course, have considered 
this to be other than ’analysis’). This is not to deny 
that conceptual analysis may be very useful, although Winch 
did fail to mention that the ’ordinary language’ philosophers, 
e.g. the Oxford School, rarely agree upon the ’usage’ of any 
term (2). Conceptual analysis can be very illuminating, e.g. 
Joseph Beatty’s analysis of the concept ’Forgiveness’ (s)< 
However, the validity of conceptual analyses cannot be veri­
fied by any experimental method: one ’sees' or one doesn’t (4).
Rule-governed behavior, although not subsumable under 
covering-laws, may manifest the characteristics of 'trends’. 
And, as Karl Popper has emphasized, trends may change over­
night (5), The most that we can do, it would seem, is to
92
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trace the forms that these various rules have taken through 
time: a methodology adopted by Eliade in his studies of 
religious phenomena (6). Blumer, and others (7), have 
stressed that social behavior is characterized by "continual 
flux": this "flux" brings into question the utility of re­
plication studies and also those studies in which, for the 
purpose of ’completeness’, a long time is spent in observa­
tion. For example, Becker states that he and his colleagues 
spent more than three man-years studying an undergraduate 
college: "All these numbers serve simply to indicate that 
there is a sufficiency of date gathered over a substantial 
period of time" (8). Assuming ’trends’ rather than ’laws’, 
what amount is a ’sufficient’ amount of data and what amount 
is a ’substantial’ amount of time? Becker discusses this in 
relation to a number of studies including those of Tepoztlan 
by Redfield and Lewis. He implies that we can never expect 
two researchers to agree because either their subject will 
have changed in the course of time, or the researchers will 
approach their subject-matter with different points of view 
(9). The researcher, like the historian (Cf. Walsh), appears 
to be the final authority concerning the validity of his 
studies (excluding statistical problems).
It was noted in Chapter I that Blumer does not provide 
criteria for differentiating between ’an act’, ’the act’ and
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•acts’. The difficulty of specifying the descriptive ele-
/
ments of an action has been seen as a serious problem by a
number of philosophers. Austin suggested that we have to:
... decide what is the correct 
name for "the" action that some­
body did - and what, indeed, are 
the rules for the use of "the" 
action, "an" action... (10, my 
emphasis)
Austin observes that it is possible to describe what a 
person did in many different ways, and that an action is 
composed of more than just physical movements (ll).
Philosophers interested in deontic logic have also 
discussed the problem of describing actions and ’states of 
affairs’. Rescher has delineated five aspects of action:
1. Agent (Who did it?)
2. Act-type (What did he do?)
3. Modality of Action (How did he do it?)
a. Modality of manner (In what manner 
did he do it?)
b. Modality of means ( ^  what means 
did he do it?)
4. Setting of Action ( ^  what context 
did he do it?)
a. Temporal aspect (when did he do it?)
b. Spatial aspect (Where did he do it?)
c. Circumstantial aspect (Under what 
circumstances did he do it?)
5. Rationale of Action (Why did he do it?)
a. Causality (What caused him to do it?)
b. Finality (With what aim did he do it?)
c. Intentionality (in what state of mind 
did he do it?) (12)
Rescher states in a footnote that the second "... is
the fundamental item in the specification of an action." (13),
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and subsequently asserts that it may vary in degree of 
concreteness: "It can be a fully generic act-type, e.g.
'the opening of a window'... (or) a specific act-type 
('the opening of this window')" (14).
Other philosophers, however, have delineated some 
problems concerning the specification of 'generic' states 
of affairs (15), While the study of the logic of actions 
is obviously very relevant for all research concerning 
rule-governed behavior, there exists the possibility that 
people are not entirely logical. Both Ackerman and Chisolm 
raise questions concerning the empirical utility of deontic 
logic and the logic of preference (16).
This thesis has acknowledged that there may be areas 
of social behavior which are not characterized by rule- 
following actions, and it is suggested that the delineation 
of these areas should be one of the primary tasks of socio­
logists: a task that Bryant has initiated (Cf. footnote 50, 
Chapter II).
There is, additionally, the need to delineate clearly 
the methods to which we relate our conceptual models to the 
observed behavior. For example, 'primary groups' occur, it 
would appear, in all cultures: but the behavior that is in­
dicative of a primary group may vary from group to group. 
The concept 'primary group' therefore appears to function
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as an Ideal Type, for which there is no exact observable 
instance. If this is the case, it is essential to delineate 
the methods and criteria that enable us to relate the ob­
served structure to the Ideal pattern. Grenander, in his 
discussion of pattern recognition, lists seven requirements 
that an analysis should meet. He states:
... if we do not specify how the 
observables are related to the pure 
patterns we have left out one of 
the most crucial steps in the whole 
approach. (17)
Although Grenander’s statement refers to pattern re­
cognition by a computer, he asserts that his analysis is 
applicable to other areas, such as biology. It is also 
relevant to sociology. Our example, the concept ’primary 
group’ has some specified characteristic behavior patterns 
as its empirical indicators. We, however, have to evaluate 
those patterns that are observed to determine their ’simi­
larity’ to our Ideal patterns. And this evaluation of 
’similarity’ has no logical basis. We can, of course, specify 
a different set of criteria, and there is no way of objectively 
deciding between the two sets of criteria.
The position of the natural sciences is no different, 
although it does appear that they are more ’objective’ (18), 
The natural sciences do, of course, have ’laws’ but there is 
Still an inherent uncertainty because more than one theory
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can be fitted to any collection of data (19) and, since 
’evidence’ within one theoretical approach is often con­
sidered ’epiphenomena’ by an alternative approach, the 
evaluation of rival theories is much more difficult that 
it might appear (20). Kuhn asserts that natural science 
may appear stable because most scientists spend most of 
their life working within one ’paradigm’, solving puzzles 
set by that ’paradigm’ (21).
Blumer’s symbolic interactionism is indeed more of an 
orientation than a theory; it cannot be subsumed under any 
covering-laws. Rule following behavior, while not amenable 
to covering-law explanations,can still be studied and des­
cribed, and these descriptions will be valid as long as 
there are no changes in the rules. As Peters has suggested:
Man in society is like a chess­
player write large. (22)
However, Peters, in the same paragraph, also asserts 
that prediction is possible: an observation that does not 
appear congruent with a chess model of society.
Although there have been many comments made about 
Winch’s argument that a nomothetic science of social be­
havior is impossible, a similar assertion had been previously 
made by Karl Popper. He stated that positive predictions in 
sociology were not possible: (23)
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We cannot exclude the logical pos­
sibility, say, of a bacterium or 
virus that spreads a wish for Nir­
vana (p 157 ).......................
... the human factor is the ultimate 
and wayward element in social life 
and social institutions... for every 
attempt at controlling it completely 
must lead to tyranny; which means, 
to the omnipotence of the human 
factor - the whims of a few men, or 
even of one. (24;
Popper suggests that social theory, while it cannot
predict, can analyze and explicate the logical consequences
of adopting any principle or embarking on any course of
action. He gives, as an example, the possible consequences
of a large number of people manifesting the desire for
mountains and solitude:
... if many people like the mountains, 
they cannot enjoy solitude... this kind 
of problem is at the very root of social 
theory. (25)
Edward A. Tiryakian has suggested that because socio­
logy lacks a philosophical background, "... research pro­
jects accumulate, but are not cumulative" (26)» The 
analyses presented in this thesis suggest that sociology, 
on the contrary, has a philosophical background, and that 
’research projects may accumulate, but cannot be cumula­
tive ’.
However, there are also structural aspects of social 
behavior which may well be amenable to covering-law
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explanations, although it must be borne in mind that,
Blumer explicitly denies the utility of structural ex­
planations (see footnotes 45 and 46 in Chapter l).
In addition, some patterns of behavior are common 
to all societies. For example, the institutions of mar­
riage and religion (27), These 'cultural universals' may 
also be amenable to covering-law explanations. Blumer, 
however, is not inclined to accept this (see footnote 73, 
Chapter I).
In conclusion, therefore, we see that, in its analytic 
aspects, Blumer's position is largely justified. Indeter­
minacy is built into any empirical analysis. Here we seem 
to be confronted with a fundamental dilemma of methodology: 
the indeterminacy of empirical knowledge versus the deter- 
minacy of logical thought. It is this dilemma that gives 
initial plausibility to Reichenbach’s argument that know­
ledge is built on a probabilistic foundation.
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NOTES: C h a p te r IV
1. Watanabe’s theorem would seem relevant for other 
theoretical approaches to the study of human be­
havior, e.g. structuralism. While this cannot be 
discussed in this paper, it should be observed that 
Watanabe’s theorem is relevant to both ’theories’ 
and descriptions. Nadel considers structuralism
to be descriptive: "I consider structuralism to be 
no more than a descriptive method ... not a piece 
of explanation". (Nadel, 1957:151)
2. Mates, 1964:68. Mates wonders what the prospects 
for agreement would be when the sample size is en­
larged.
3. Beatty, 1970:246-252. American Philosopical 
Quarterly 7, No.3, (July, 1970), pp 246-252.
For an example of conceptual analysis by an 
anthropologist see: Hyman, 1966:42-45.
4. D.B. Fry states that experimental methods can 
neither confirm nor contradict knowledge that is 
obtained by introspection "... since an experi­
mental method and an introspective method col­
lect information about different sets of events".
(Fry, 1955:147)
5. Barrington Moore observes that George Lundberg,
"... confessed that he was at a loss for a good 
example of scientific generalization... the only 
one he could point to was a rather limited one about 
migration... His remark (led) me to doubt that the
"search for scientific laws should constitute the 
primary task of sociology". (Moore, 1963:93n)
6. Geertz, 1968:403. Geertz thus assesses Eliade’s 
methodology. Geertz also notes that this is a 
kind of "cultural paleontology", and that "it has 
placed beyond the range of scientific analysis 
everything but the history and morphology of the 
... forms...".
Geertz claims that Eliade has uncovered 
"some highly suggestive clusterings". However, 
given that rule-governed behavior is not sub­
sumable under a ’law’, it is difficult to eva­
luate the significance of any "suggestive clusterings"
100
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7. Boskoff asserts that Mclver places social change 
at the core of his system. (Boskoff, 1969:125)
8. Becker, 1970:53.
9. Becker, 1970:19,40-43. Kobben also discusses this 
problem and gives some examples of ethnographic 
reports which have conflicting statements.
10. Austin, 1965:44.
11. D.W. Hamlyn discusses the differences between 
actions and physical movements. He traces the 
distinction back to Aristotle. (Hamlyn, 1962:60-73)
12. Rescher, N.D., 215-216.
13. Rescher, N.D.: 215n.
14. Rescher, N.D.: 216.
15. John Robinson discusses the distinction between 
states of affairs "conceived of generically and 
individually". (Robinson, N.D: 140)
16. Rescher, N.D.: 71,138.
17. Grenader, 1970:177.
18. Lawrence LaFave has discussed the way in which 
values enier into science. (LaFave, 1970)
19. Kuhn, 1970:76.
20. See Feyerabend' s discussion of the difficulties 
involved in comparing theories. (Feyerabend, 
1968:12-39).
21. Kuhn, 1970:24,36-38.
22. Peters, 1958:7.
23. Popper, 1957:158. Universal laws, for Popper, 
asserts the impossibility of something, not the 
existence of anything, (p 61)
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24. Popper, 1957:157-158.
25. Popper, 1957:158. His examples of social pre­
dictions are, of course, all negative; i.e. 
assert the impossibility of something: "You can­
not introduce tariffs and at the same time reduce 
the cost of living". "You cannot introduce a 
political reform without causing some repercussions 
which are undesirable from the point of view of the 
ends aimed at". These examples express logical 
impossibilities, and can be rephrased into logical 
contradictions. For instance, the tariff example 
can be rephrased: If a country is importing a com­
modity which sells for less than a comparable do­
mestic commodity, any import restriction or tax
on the imported commodity will remove a 'cheap' 
commodity from the market and thereby make pur­
chasers pay more. In other words, if the technical 
terms in this social law are replaced by synonyms, 
the statement expresses a logical contradiction.
It appears that the method of developing these 
'laws' is 'conceptual analysis'.
26. Tiryakian, 1962:4.
27. There are problems in defining these terms. For 
example, if religion is defined so as to include 
animism, the definition may be unacceptable to 
many theists. For a brief discussion of the 
criteria used to define religion, see John Hick 
Philosophv of Religion. New Jersey: Prentice- 
Hall Inc. there are similar problems with the 
universal definition of 'marriage'. See Wm. N. 
Stephens, The Familv in Cross-cultural Perspec­
tive. New York: Holt Rhinehart and Winston 
Inc., 1963. pp Bff.
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